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ABSTRACT 
Newly released data on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within-country 
variation, with the variation increasing as legal environment gets less investor friendly. This 
paper examines why firms practice high-quality governance when law does not require it; firm 
attributes related to the quality of governance; how the attributes interact with legal environment; 
and the relation between firm valuation and corporate governance. A simple model, in which a 
controlling shareholder trades off private benefits of diversion against costs that vary across 
countries and time, identifies three relevant firm attributes: investment opportunities, external 
financing, and ownership structure. Using firm-level governance and transparency data on 859 
firms in 27 countries, we find that firms with greater growth opportunities, greater needs for 
external financing, and more concentrated cash flow rights practice higher-quality governance 
and disclose more. Moreover, firms that score higher in governance and transparency rankings 
are valued higher in the stock market. Equally important, all these relations are stronger in 
countries that are less investor friendly, demonstrating that firms do adapt to poor legal 
environments to establish efficient governance practices.  
 
JEL Classification: G32 (Financial Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure), K23 (Corporation 
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Do all firms in weak legal regimes suffer from poor corporate governance, whereas firms in 
strong legal regimes practice uniformly high-quality governance? Or do firms adapt to poor legal 
environment as in Coase (1960), resulting in some firms having higher quality governance than is 
required by law? Newly released data on 859 firms in 27 countries reveal wide within-country 
variation in governance and disclosure practices, with the variation increasing as legal 
environment gets less investor friendly. This raises several questions: Does the wider variation in 
weaker legal regimes simply reflect greater latitudes allowed by lower minimum standards?  Or is 
there a systematic pattern in which firms choose their quality of governance amid greater 
latitude?  If so, what are the relevant firm attributes and how are they related to the observed 
governance practices? Is the quality of governance priced in stock markets, and if so, is it 
economically significant for corporate decision makers to take notice? These are the issues 
addressed in this paper.  
Previous studies have examined the effects of legal environment on corporate governance, 
and the relation between corporate governance and firm performance.  Specifically, it has been 
shown that better legal protection for investors is associated with higher valuation of the stock 
market (La Porta et al. (2002)), higher valuation of listed firms relative to their assets or changes 
in investments (Wurgler (2000)), and larger listed firms in terms of their sales and assets (Kumar, 
Rajan, and Zingales (1999)). Furthermore, industries and firms in better legal regimes rely more 
on external financing to fund their growth (La Porta et al. (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998)). 
Although these country-level studies provide valuable insights into the effects of regulatory 
environment, they do not address firm-level issues such as what drives different governance 
practices across firms within a legal regime or how governance affects individual firm valuation. 
Previous studies on the relation between governance and firm performance using U.S. data show William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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mostly mixed and somewhat conflicting results.
1 Recent studies based on international data, on 
the other hand, are more affirmative: Black (2001) and Black, Jang, and Kim (2002) demonstrate 
a strong relation between corporate governance and firm valuation in Russia and Korea, and 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) show that foreign firms listed on U.S. stock markets are valued 
higher (see Denis and McConnell (2003) for a recent review of the literature).  
Building on insights provided by these authors, this paper offers four main contributions. 
First, it documents a wide within-country variation in corporate governance that decreases with 
the strength of legal environment.  Second, the paper identifies three firm attributes related to the 
quality of governance, analyzes their interaction with legal environment, and empirically 
examines the hypothesized relations. Third, it re-examines the relation between governance and 
firm valuation by using a large sample of firms for 27 countries. Finally, the paper documents 
stronger relations between firm attributes, governance practices, and firm valuation in less 
investor friendly countries. 
To identify relevant firm attributes, we provide a simple model of optimal diversion of 
corporate resources by a controlling shareholder who faces private costs of diversion that increase 
with the strength of legal environment.  The costs are also asset-specific and vary over time, 
which sometimes cause the shareholder to reject positive net present value (NPV) projects in the 
process of diversion. This potential value destruction and the costs are traded off against private 
benefits in determining the optimal diversion.  
The model predicts that (1) firms with better investment opportunities, higher concentration 
of ownership, and greater needs for external financing practice better governance; (2) firms that 
practice better governance have higher value; and (3) these relations are stronger in weaker legal 
regimes. 
                                                 
1 A partial list of these studies includes Bhagat and Brickley (1984), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Bhagat and 
Jefferis (1991), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Gompers, Ishi, and Metrick (2003). See Denis and 
McConnell (2003) for a more complete list. 
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The basic intuitions underlying these predictions are simple. One is less likely to commit 
crime if one has something valuable to lose: profitable investment opportunities. One does not 
steal from oneself: ownership concentration. One does not spit into the well from which one 
drinks: external financing. As for the interplay between firm attributes and legal environment, 
good corporate governance driven by private incentives becomes a more important mitigator in 
alleviating the harmful effects of ineffective legal framework when regulation is weak. And 
finally, good corporate governance is valued higher where it is scarce; namely, in weaker legal 
regimes. 
These predictions are tested with data on the quality of corporate governance practice 
compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), while using Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
disclosure data as a robustness check.  The CLSA data rely on an intuitively appealing 
comprehensive, yet partially subjective method, while S&P scores are objective. In making the 
transition from theory to empirically testable hypotheses, we relate the optimal diversion of 
corporate resources to the quality of governance practice. To check if governance practices are a 
reasonable proxy for diversion, we relate corporate scandals to CLSA scores.  We find that firms 
with low CLSA governance scores are more likely to be mentioned in scandals reported by the 
media.  
As predicted by the model, the quality of governance practice is positively related to growth 
opportunities, concentration of ownership, and need for external financing. Furthermore, these 
relations are stronger in less investor friendly legal environments. Consistent with Coase, firms 
seem to adapt to legal environments to effect efficient governance practices. 
The data also reveal that firms with better governance enjoy higher valuation.
2 One standard 
deviation increase in governance score increases a firm’s market value by 9.0 percent, on 
average, with a stronger impact in weaker legal regimes. For example, for firms in Mexico, which 
                                                 
2 In a contemporaneous study Klapper and Love (2002) also document a similar relation using CLSA data. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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scores the lowest in our sample in terms of the strength of legal framework, one standard 
deviation in governance scores changes the market value by 12.6 percent, whereas the same 
change in Hong Kong or Chile, which provides the strongest legal framework in our sample, 
affects the value by only 5.6 percent.  
Section I describes the data on governance and disclosure practices, relates them to corporate 
scandals, and demonstrates the wide within-country variation. Section II presents the simple 
model to provide empirical hypotheses concerning the relations among the three firm attributes, 
quality of governance, legal environment, and firm valuation. Empirical design and data are 
described in Section III. Section IV reports empirical results, and Section V provides robustness 
checks. The concluding section contains a summary and implications. 
I. Within-Country Variation in Corporate Governance Practices 
In this section we describe the data on the quality of governance and disclosure practices. We 
also compile corporate scandals for a sub-sample of firms and examine the relation between 
scandals and governance scores. Then we document that both governance scores and disclosure 
scores reveal wide within-country variation inversely related to the strength of legal environment. 
A. CLSA Corporate Governance Scores 
CLSA (2001) issued a report on governance practices by 494 companies in 24 countries 
providing scores on the quality of governance in year 2000. Firms are selected based on size 
(large) and investor interest (high). The governance scores are based on responses from financial 
analysts to 57 questions that are used to construct scores on a 1-100 scale, where a higher number 
indicates better governance. According to CLSA, 70 percent of the scores are based on objective 
information and all questions have binary answers (yes/no) to minimize analysts’ subjectivity.
3 It 
also attempts to provide firm-level information beyond the mere effect of legal environment: 
                                                 
3 Anecdotal evidence supporting CLSA’s claim of objectivity is a report that CLSA has “lost quite a bit of 
corporate finance business” with companies that were assigned the worst corporate governance scores and 
that CLSA may stop compiling the scores. (South China Morning Post: Hong Kong; Nov 2, 2001).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
  5
“Our scores do not mark down a company simply for being in a country that might be perceived 
to have a weak regulatory or legal framework." [CLSA Emerging Markets (2002), p. 9] 
Scores on the 57 questions are grouped into six categories of corporate governance and an 
index of social responsibility: discipline (managerial incentives and discipline towards value 
maximizing actions), transparency (timely and accurate disclosure), independence (board 
independence),  accountability (board accountability), responsibility (enforcement and 
management accountability), protection (minority shareholder protection); and social awareness 
(social responsibility). We compute the composite governance index, COMP, by taking a simple 
average of the first six categories and examine social awareness separately. 
B. Corporate Scandals 
To investigate whether the quality of governance practices measured by CLSA scores are 
related to corporate misdeeds, we compile scandals for 84 firms in 14 countries that have CLSA 
scores for more than 11 firms.
4 For each country we select the top three and the bottom three 
firms in CLSA composite score and manually scan for mention of these companies in articles in 
the Lexis-Nexis database during a three-year period—01/01/1999 through 12/31/2001.
5 We then 
look for scandals such as asset expropriation, accounting misreporting, earnings manipulation, 
stock price manipulation, insider trading, share dilution, and undertaking illegal projects. There 
are 29,320 articles covering stories on the sample firms, from which we identify 49 scandals— if 
the same scandal appears in multiple articles, we count it only once. Many are media accusations 
of wrongdoing that have not yet been tried in court. The majority of companies (68 percent) have 
no reported scandals while those with scandals have, on average, 1.8 scandals reported. 
The simple correlation between the number of scandals, SCAND, and CLSA composite score 
is  −0.36 (p-value = 0.00), suggesting that more firms with low CLSA scores are linked to 
                                                 
4 These countries are Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. 
5 Because scandal data collection began in early 2002, we limit the sample period to the end of year 2001. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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scandals. However, other factors may also be related to scandals being reported: the legal 
environment; the investigative ability of news media and the freedom to report scandals; and the 
relative media attention a firm receives in general.  
B.1 Measures of Legal Environment and News Media 
Our measure of the strength of legal environment is based on both de jure and de facto 
aspects of regulation. The de jure measure of investor protection, INVESTOR, is the anti-director 
rights (shareholder rights) index defined in La Porta et al. (1998a), and it ranges from 0 to 6. We 
cannot rely solely on this measure because India and Pakistan, countries which do not have the 
best de facto investor protection, score 5, the highest in our sample on INVESTOR. To measure 
the strength of de facto regulation, we use the rule of law index, ENFORCE, from the 
International Country Risk Guide as a proxy for law enforcement. The rule of law assesses the 
law and order tradition of a country, and it ranges from 0 to 10.
6 
There is little correlation between de jure and de facto measures of regulation. The 
correlation coefficient between INVESTOR and ENFORCE is only 0.18 with p-value = 0.38.  We 
multiply INVESTOR by ENFORCE to construct a measure that reflects both aspects of regulation, 
and define it LEGAL. 
The investigative ability of news media and the freedom to report scandals is proxied by 
circulation of daily newspapers per capita reported in Dyck and Zingales (2002), NEWS. The 
relative media attention a firm receives is proxied by the log of the total number of articles 
covering stories on the sample firm, TOTAL. 
 
 
                                                 
6 ENFORCE is calculated as the 1999-to-2000 monthly average. As in La Porta et al. (1998a) the original 
series is transformed from 0-6 to 0-10.  An alternative is to use the efficiency of the judicial system index 
reported in La Porta et al. (1998a). We use the rule of law for two reasons. First, using the efficiency of the 
judicial system would reduce our sample size because this variable is not defined for China, Hungary, 
Poland, and Russia in La Porta et al. (1998a). Second, the two variables are highly correlated. The 
correlation between the rule of law and the efficiency of the judicial system (based on the sample of 
countries in La Porta et al. (1998a)) is 0.64 (p-val = 0.00). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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B.2 Relation between CLSA Scores and Scandals 
We regress the number of scandals, SCANDAL, on CLSA composite score, COMP, as well as 
on LEGAL, NEWS, and TOTAL. Because observations on individual companies in a given 
country are not independent, we estimate the regression with country-random effects, which takes 
into account that errors among observations are correlated. The validity of the random effects 
specification is justified by the Breusch and Pagan (1980) test that rejects the null hypothesis that 
the errors are uncorrelated within countries.  
The results are reported in Table I with two specifications: the first controls for LEGAL and 
TOTAL, and the second adds NEWS  to the first specification. The coefficient on COMP is 
significantly negative in both specifications, indicating that firms scoring low on CLSA ratings 
are more likely to have scandals reported in media.
7 The coefficient on TOTAL is significantly 
positive in both specifications, suggesting that greater media attention tends to lead to more 
exposure of corporate scandals.   
The coefficients on LEGAL and NEWS are not significant, however. We suspect two 
offsetting effects are going on in both variables. Take the case of NEWS. To the extent that higher 
newspaper circulation leads to greater exposure of corporate scandals, one would expect a 
positive correlation. However, higher circulation can also have a preventive effect as documented 
by Dyck and Zingales (2002). Similarly, a more efficient judicial system may lead to more 
exposure of scandals, but may also have a preventive effect reducing the number of wrongdoings 
that can be exposed by the media.  
C.  Standard & Poor’s Transparency Scores 
As a robustness check on results based on CLSA scores, we use Standard & Poor’s measure 
of corporate disclosure practices for 573 companies in 16 emerging markets and 3 developed 
countries in 2000. The measure counts whether a firm discloses relevant information on 91 
                                                 
7 Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2002) also examine corporate scandals for Indian firms covered by CLSA 
and find a significant negative correlation between scandals and CLSA rankings. 
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possible items that would be of interest to investors: 22 items on ownership structure and investor 
relations (ownership), 34 items on accounting and financial policies (disclosure), and 35 items on 
board and management structure and process (board). Then it assigns scores from 0 to 22 for 
ownership, from 0 to 34 for disclosure, and from 0 to 35 for board. The scores of the three 
categories are summed to create an aggregate transparency score, TRAN, ranging from 0 to 91, 
which is equivalent to assigning an equal weight to each disclosed item.
8 
We interpret these scores as an indicator of the quality of disclosure practice. If a firm has 
more disclosure on ownership-related items, for example, we infer the firm has less to hide and 
hence has a relatively sound practice on matters concerning ownership structure. Conversely, 
reluctance to reveal items concerning board structure is interpreted as having a relatively unsound 
practice in that category. 
The advantage of S&P scores lies in its objectivity, whereas CLSA scores are comprehensive, 
but susceptible to subjectivity. S&P scores, however, depend only on the number of disclosures, 
and do not reflect the content. They are best viewed as a measure of transparency and not a 
comprehensive measure of corporate governance. 
D. Consistency across CLSA and S&P Scores 
To determine whether companies scored high on corporate governance by CLSA are also 
scored high on disclosure by S&P, we identify 208 companies that are ranked by both agencies. 
Table II reports correlation coefficients between different categories of CLSA and S&P scores. 
All of the categories of CLSA scores are highly correlated with each other except for social 
awareness. Different categories of S&P scores are also significantly correlated with each other, 
indicating that firms that disclose more in one category tend to disclose more in other categories. 
The correlations across CLSA and S&P scores reveal that CLSA composite index, COMP, is 
significantly correlated with S&P aggregate score, TRAN. To check whether the correlation is due 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of S&P Transparency Scores, go to www.governance.standardandpoors.com. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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to country and industry differences, we regress CLSA composite index on S&P aggregate score 
with country and industry dummies. The relation remains significant, confirming the consistency 
between the two rankings.
9 
Although scores on many individual categories of the CLSA ranking are not correlated with 
those of S&P’s ranking, the correlations are positive and significant when the individual 
categories are measured on overlapping characteristics. For instance, S&P score on accounting 
and financial policies (disclosure) is significantly correlated with CLSA score on transparency; 
S&P score on board and management structure and process (board) is significantly correlated 
with CLSA score on board accountability (accountability), and so on. These correlations, as well 
as the lack thereof, suggest that S&P scores provide valuable data to check the robustness of 
results based on CLSA scores.
10 
E. Within-Country Variation of Corporate Governance Scores 
Table III provides summary statistics by country for legal regime variables, CLSA composite 
scores, and S&P aggregate scores. To examine whether countries with strong legal frameworks 
tend to have high average CLSA and S&P scores, we regress the country average scores on 
LEGAL for countries with ten or more firms. For CLSA scores, we obtain:
11 
COMP = 37.25 + 0.43 * LEGAL (R
2 = 0.25, N = 15),                [1] 
               [0.00]   [0.01] 
 
                                                 
9 The regression is:  
COMP = 0.16×TRAN + Σi di + Σc dc      R
2 = 0.46, 
                [0.05] 
where  di and dc  are industry and country dummies (coefficients not reported), respectively, R
2 is the 
coefficient of determination, and the number inside brackets is the probability level at which zero 
coefficient can be rejected. 
10 It is possible that the firms in CLSA and S&P rankings may suffer from selection and reporting bias; 
namely, only firms with good governance practices may cooperate with the CLSA survey and the ranking 
agencies may choose firms that are easier to assign scores. However, companies have incentives to 
cooperate because exclusion from the ranking may create ill reputation, and the ranking agencies have a 
commercial interest in listing a well-balanced portfolio of companies. We further investigate the sample 
selection issue in Section V. 
11 For S&P scores the regression gives the following results: 
  TRAN = 28.72 + 0.36 * LEGAL (R
2  =  0.24,  N  =  14).      [1a] 
                              [0.00]   [0.06] 
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where R
2 is the coefficient of determination, N is the number of countries, and the numbers inside 
brackets are probability levels based on heteroschedasticity-consistent standard errors at which 
the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected.  
Given the result in [1], we define the conditional variation of individual firm governance 
practices as the portion of governance scores not explained by legal regime. Namely, we repeat 
[1] at the firm-level for CLSA composite score, COMP; CLSA score on investor protection, 
PROTECT; and S&P transparency ranking, TRANS.  We then take the absolute values of the 
residuals and regress the deviations on LEGAL. The results are reported in Panel A of Table IV. 
The coefficient on LEGAL is negative and significant in all cases. Thus, we conclude within-
country variation in governance and disclosure practices is larger when legal environment is less 
investor friendly.  
As stated at the outset, these variations raise several questions. Does the inverse relation 
between within-country variation and legal environment simply reflect greater latitudes allowed 
by lower minimum legal standards? Why do firms practice high-quality governance when law 
does not require it? What are the attributes, if any, that are related to a firm’s choice of 
governance? How do these attributes interact with legal environment in Coase’s sense? We 
address these questions next. 
II. Theoretical Considerations 
We consider an environment similar to Johnson et al. (2000) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2003), in which controlling shareholders divert corporate resources for private benefits and 
diversion is costly.
12 Following Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) view that “Corporate governance 
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment.” (p. 737), we define the quality of governance as the degree to which 
                                                 
12 Because the primary purpose of this section is to provide motivation for empirical tests, we do not 
consider issues such as determinants of initial ownership and capital structure in different legal regimes 
(e.g., Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2002)). Nor do we consider the reputation-type issues discussed in 
Diamond (1991), Maksimovic and Titman (1991), and Gomes (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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non-controlling shareholders get their fair share. Specifically, we relate diversion to corporate 
governance by defining the quality of governance as (1-d), where d is the proportion of firm value 
diverted from the maximum attainable value at zero diversion with the value maximizing 
investment policy. Thus, a high level of d implies poor governance practice, where d is broadly 
defined to include a wide range of value-decreasing activities from what Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) define as excessive shirking and corporate perks to outright stealing of tangible and 
intangible corporate resources.
13 
This definition of the quality of governance captures various governance and managerial 
practices in place that affect firm value for all shareholders, where the practices may or may not 
be legally binding. Therefore, the six categories of governance practice defined by CLSA—
independence and accountability of the board of directors, financial incentives and managerial 
discipline for value creation, enforcement of managerial responsibility and accountability, timely 
and accurate disclosure of relevant information, assurance to maintain auditors’ independence, 
and protection of minority shareholders—represent the key aspects of our definition. 
A.  Costs and Timing of Diversion 
The costs of diversion to the controlling shareholder can be categorized as direct and indirect. 
The direct costs are of three types.  One is the (expected) penalty when diversion is illegal and the 
shareholder is caught. Such penalties may take the form of fines, jail terms, and loss of reputation 
that may hurt the shareholder’s future business or employment opportunities. Another type is the 
cost incurred for the act of diverting resources, such as bribes to employees, regulators, and 
politicians. A third type is the deadweight loss arising from the fact that the private value of 
excessive corporate perks or cash equivalent value of diverted resources is often less than their 
fair value. 
                                                 
13 Because of the opportunistic nature of stealing and the incentive to hide it, stealing takes many different 
forms that are sometimes highly creative.  See Johnson, LaPorta, and Lopez-de-Silanes (2000) for a 
description of tunneling and Siegel (2003) for examples of various legal and illegal assets taking by 
controlling shareholders and CEOs of Mexican firms during the mid-90s. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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These costs vary across countries due to differences in regulatory environment, with higher 
costs in countries with strong legal protection for investors.
14 Costs also vary across industries 
within a legal regime due to differences in the nature of assets and business models involved. For 
example, the costs are higher for tangible assets because it is easier to steal ideas or business 
plans than factories and buildings, and for firms in regulated industries because they are more 
closely monitored. 
The costs also vary over time, and diversion takes place when the chances of getting caught, 
or more generally, the costs, are the lowest. For example, if the controlling shareholder has a 
special connection to the current political regime that will be replaced soon, or has an unusually 
cooperative auditor who will retire soon, diversion is likely to occur now rather than later. 
Likewise, the direct costs of diversion are lower when a project is at the idea or business plan 
stage than after the project becomes tangible assets such as plants and equipment. 
If the cost of diversion increases sufficiently after investments, diversion may impose indirect 
costs in the form of rejecting positive NPV projects.  Consider a controlling shareholder who 
owns 30 percent of a firm’s cash flow rights. The firm has just identified a profitable business 
opportunity after spending a considerable amount of corporate resources.  Instead of having the 
firm undertake the project, however, she is contemplating whether to give the project to her son 
and have him take the project within a new private firm, which she owns 100 percent. If the 
project is undertaken by the original firm, its NPV is $1,000; but under the new firm, it is worth 
only $700 because the new firm does not have the necessary facilities to undertake the project. 
                                                 
14  We assume the strength of legal regimes is exogenous to the observed level of malfeasance.  As 
witnessed during the recent corporate scandals following the Enron debacle, however, governments react to 
revelations of widespread corporate misdeeds, with those more responsive to public opinions being more 
inclined to undertake legal reforms. There are several justifications for our assumption. First, reforming 
legal systems is a slow process because it inevitably becomes a political issue, with the controlling 
shareholders–and those who benefit by association–insisting on the status quo (see Bebchuk and Roe 
(1999) and Rajan and Zingales (2002)). Second, if the number of firms is sufficiently large, the controlling 
shareholder may behave as if her actions will have no effect on the cost of diversion. Finally, the cost can 
be interpreted as the shareholder’s perceived cost that takes into account the effects of her action on future 
legal reforms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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The shareholder has to make two decisions: (1) to steal or not to steal and (2) when to steal. If the 
first decision has to be made now for some reason and the cost of stealing is ten percent, she will 
steal because the net benefit is $630 ($700×0.9), whereas her share of the firm’s NPV is only 
$300 ($1,000×0.3). However, she will be better off having the original firm make the investment 
and stealing later, if the cost of stealing remains unchanged at 10 percent, because the net benefit 
of stealing later increases to $900 ($1,000×0.9).
15 
Generally it costs less to steal an idea or a new business plan than to steal tangible assets, 
such as plants and buildings, resulting from investments because of difficulties in identifying 
properties involved and exercising property rights. If the costs of stealing increase to, say, 40 
percent after the investment is made, it would be better to steal now because the net benefit of 
stealing later would be only $600 ($1,000×0.6). The end result will be a destruction of value: the 
reduction of NPV from $1,000 to $700. 
Therefore, timing of diversion depends on how costs vary over time; and sometimes 
diversion imposes an indirect cost in the form of rejecting positive NPV projects. In practice, 
however, the timing is not as clear-cut as suggested in the example, as the beginning of one 
period represents an end to the preceding period.  Furthermore, how the costs change over time 
differs across firms and projects because of firm-specific situations and project-specific factors. 
B. A Simple Model 
To incorporate these various aspects of costs and timing of diversion in a simple model that 
can provide empirically testable hypotheses, two approaches can be taken:  (1) The increase in 
direct costs after investments is large enough to force the controlling shareholder to choose 
between diversion and investments now–e.g., steal before investments are made as in Johnson et 
al. (2000). (2) The cost increase is small enough to make her wait until after investments are 
made–e.g., steal later as in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2003). In this paper we take the first 
                                                 
15 For the sake of brevity, we assume zero discount rate. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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approach in the text and consider the second in Appendix A. Both approaches lead to the same set 
of hypotheses. The trade-off between the private benefits of diversion and rejection of profitable 
projects with a linear cost function drives the results in the first approach; in the second, it is the 
trade-off between the private benefits and the convexity in the cost of diversion.  
We consider a simple investment opportunity set in a single period. The firm will liquidate 
when the returns are realized, from which the controlling shareholder collects her share of the 
liquidating dividends. The interest rate is zero and investors are risk-neutral such that the cost of 
capital is zero. 
The gross return per unit of physical capital invested in project j is equal to  ) ( 1 j π + , where 
0 ≥ j  and  ) ( j π  is linear and decreasing in j for all firms with each firm having a maximum of 
0 > π .  Although we do not put subscript i to π  for notational simplicity, π varies across firms 
and, hence, is the variable that differentiates the profitability of investment opportunities across 
firms. With this definition, the gross return for the j
th unit of capital invested can be written as 
j j − + = + π π 1 ) ( 1 .  If a firm takes all positive NPV projects, it will invest until  1 1 = − + j π , 
and the units of capital invested will be  π = j . 
The cost of diversion is assumed to be linear; it is a constant fraction, c, of the amount 
diverted.  In this situation the controlling shareholder, who owns α fraction of cash flow rights, 
will divert only when  α − <1 c , because one dollar of diversion creates wealth transfer of 1 – α 
from other shareholders giving her a net benefit of 1 – α  – c.
16 
The controlling shareholder will invest as long as her share of liquidating dividends from a 
project is greater than the after-cost diversion, namely, if  c j − > + 1 )) ( 1 ( π α . Thus she will 
invest up to the point where:  
απ () 11 +−= − jc .       [ 2 ]  
                                                 
16 When c > 1 – α , there will be no diversion, and hence, we only consider the case where  α − <1 c . William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Equation [2] gives the controlling shareholder’s optimal level of investment,  
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.    [3] 
To obtain the optimal diversion, the cash equivalent value of the firms’ assets, or internal 
funds available, is written as  0 > + = e F π , where e is a constant indicating whether the firm has 
sufficient funds to invest in all positive NPV projects (e ≥ 0) or not (e < 0).
17 The funds remaining 
after the investment, 
* j F − , will be diverted if the after-cost benefits of diversion is greater than 
the controlling stockholder’s share of liquidating dividends from it: (F - j
*)(1 - c) > a(F - j
*) or  
α − <1 c . Thus, the optimal amount of diversion D* is equal to  j F −  if c < 1 - α, and 0 
otherwise. Since  e F + =π , it follows from equation [3] that 
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.   [4] 
Dividing  D* by the firm’s endowment,  e + π , we obtain our proxy for the quality of 
corporate governance, the optimal proportion of firm value diverted, 
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.    [5]     
Figure 1 illustrates the investment opportunity set with e = 0 and how the firm value is 
reduced due to diversion and rejection of positive NPV projects. The Investment opportunity is 
denoted by the broken line. The maximum possible value of the firm at d* = 0 is represented by 
the area  0 ) 1 ( BC π + . The optimal diversion, D*, reduces the NPV of the firm by the triangle 
area ABE reducing the value of the firm to the smaller are of  0 ) 1 ( AF π + .  
 
                                                 
17 The budget constraint,  e j + <π , may become binding if e is negative, i.e., the endowment is insufficient 
to fund all positive NPV projects. Although the above derivations assume non-negative e, it is easy to show 
that all the results hold with negative e. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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C.  Hypotheses 
Equation [5] specifies how d* is related to the variables of interest, namely, c, α, and π . 
Taking partial derivatives of d* with respect to these variables provides a number of testable 
hypotheses. The most obvious is that d* is negatively related to the cost of diversion c, our proxy 
for the strength of legal environment. Restating the well-known result, 
Hypothesis 1: In strong legal regimes (high-c countries), firms will divert less and practice 
higher quality corporate governance. 
Taking partial derivative of d* with respect to π , profitability of investment opportunities,   
∂
∂π
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απ
πα α d
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c *
()
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

 
1
11 1
0
2 < 0    if   
                              otherwise
  
.   [6] 
This derivative is negative because diversion takes place only when  α − <1 c . The intuition is 
straightforward. When investment opportunities are more profitable, the controlling shareholder’s 
share of return from investments is larger relative to the benefits of diversion. Thus, we obtain 
Hypothesis 2: Controlling shareholders of firms with more profitable investment opportunities 
divert less for private gains and practice higher quality corporate governance. 
Equation [6] also implies that when a firm suffers a substantial drop in profitable investment 
opportunities, the controlling shareholders will divert more corporate resources. Johnson et al. 
(2000) document such behavior by Asian firms before the Asian financial crisis. In the U. S. the 
media alleges similar actions by the top management of Enron, Worldcom, and other firms with 
subsequent scandals, prior to their filing bankruptcy.
18 
The impact of investment opportunities on governance practice may vary across legal 
regimes, which can be seen by taking derivative of equation [6] with respect to c, 
                                                 
18 Equation [6] also shows that the partial derivative is zero when  ) 1 ( 1 π α + − < c . Such circumstances 
arise when investor protection is so weak (c is so small relative to profitability of investment opportunities) 
that the firm’s entire resources are diverted without undertaking any investments.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Equation [7] shows that the sensitivity of diversion to investment opportunities falls as the cost of 
diversion rises. In other words, the positive relation between investment opportunities and the 
quality of governance is stronger in weaker legal regimes. This is because the potential value 
destruction from rejecting positive NPV projects is greater in weaker legal frameworks and those 
with good investment opportunities have greater incentives to mitigate it through good 
governance. We propose 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of investment opportunities on the quality of governance practices is 
stronger in a country with weaker legal environment. 
To illustrate, consider two countries, say the U.S. that has relatively low tolerance for 
diversion and imposes high cost, and Russia that is more tolerant and imposes lower costs. 
Hypothesis 3 implies that the same increase in profitable investment opportunities will have a 
smaller negative impact on d in the U.S. than in Russia. 
For numerical illustration assume the cost of diversion, c, is equal to 0.6 in the U.S. and 0.3 in 
Russia and the excess cash, e, is equal to 0 in all cases. A low profit firm has an investment 
opportunity set with π L = 20 . . The payoff to the controlling shareholder is  D c MV ) 1 ( − + α  
where the market value, MV, is the present value of gross returns from all projects undertaken; 
MV j dj d d d
=+ − = − + − −
∫ () ( ) () *
*2 ()
*
11 1
2
2
0
1
ππ π π
.  With α = 0.3 her payoff is maximized at 
dL
* . = 067 if the firm is located in Russia; if located in the U.S., dL
* . = 017. Now, assume the 
firm’s investment opportunity improves to π H = 22 . . Then the optimal diversion will decrease 
from 0.67 to 0.61 for the Russian firm. For the U.S. firm the decrease will be smaller; from 0.17 
to 0.15. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Figure 2 illustrates the payoff function to the controlling shareholders as well as the optimal 
diversion levels. The figure also shows that the variation in d is greater in Russia than in the 
U.S.
19 Thus we conjecture 
Conjecture 1: Everything else being equal, within-country variation in the quality of governance 
is greater in weaker legal regimes. 
The impact of ownership concentration can be seen by differentiating d* with respect to α, 
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 .  [8] 
This is the well-known Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency argument that entrepreneurs with 
higher ownership divert less, which can be restated as  
Hypothesis 4: Controlling shareholders with greater cash flow rights practice higher quality 
corporate governance. 
A more interesting result is obtained by differentiating equation [8] with respect to c, 
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.   [9] 
Equation [9] shows that the sensitivity of diversion to ownership concentration falls as the cost of 
diversion rises. In other words, the positive relation between ownership and the quality of 
governance is stronger in weaker legal regimes. In the absence of adequate legal protection for 
investors, concentrated ownership becomes a more important tool to resolve the agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders.
20 Thus we propose 
                                                 
19 Assume two-firm economies in which both firms L and H exist in the U.S. and in Russia such that the 
deviation in π  between the two firms in both countries is the same 0.2.  But the deviation in d* is 0.06 in 
Russia and 0.02 in the U.S. Thus firms in Russia would show greater variation in corporate governance 
than those in the U.S.  The variation also depends on π  because  d* is negatively related to π . To 
illustrate, again consider a two-firm economy in which firm L’s π  is 3 and firm H’s π  is 3.3, the same 10 
percent difference as above. In this case d*L = 0.44 and d*H = 0.40 in Russia and, d*L = 0.11 and d*H = 0.10 
in the U.S., reducing the deviation in d* to 0.04 in Russia and 0.01 in the U.S. 
20 Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) obtain a similar result under a more restrictive set of assumptions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Hypothesis 5: The impact of ownership concentration on the quality of governance is greater in 
a weaker legal regime. 
Although it is not shown in equation [5], the quality of governance may also be related to 
external financing. We have already shown an obvious reason: Firms with profitable investment 
opportunities will have better corporate governance. If profitable investment opportunities lead to 
more external financing, firms with greater external financing are likely to have better corporate 
governance.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), however, predict the opposite. They argue that 
profitable firms have more internally generated funds and, hence, rely less on external financing. 
Thus we isolate the impact of external financing from that of profitability of investment 
opportunities by assuming that investment is given. We also assume that external financing is 
bounded from above by a minimum level of cash flow rights necessary to maintain the control 
and that new investors rationally anticipate diversion. Under these assumptions we show in 
Appendix B that firms in greater need for external financing have greater incentives to enhance 
the quality of governance, which leads to 
Hypothesis 6: For a given level of profitable investment opportunities, controlling shareholders 
of firms with greater need for external financing will practice higher quality governance. 
One reason firms in weaker legal regimes have difficulty raising external capital is investors’ 
lack of trust in protection of their rights. Firms have incentives to alleviate their concerns by 
practicing high-quality governance, with the incentive being greater among firms that suffer more 
from the adverse effect; namely, firms located in weaker legal regimes.  Hence we conjecture 
Conjecture 2: The positive relation between external financing needs and the quality of 
governance is stronger in a weaker legal environment. 
Finally, we examine the relation between the quality of governance and firm valuation by 
defining the market value of a firm, MV, as the present value of gross returns from projects,  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Equation [10] shows that the market value of the firm increases as d* decreases; thus,  
Hypothesis 7: Firms with high-quality governance are valued higher. 
Since high-quality governance is relatively scarce in weak legal regimes, everything else 
being equal, the few firms with good governance are likely to be valued more in poor legal 
environment. Thus,  
Conjecture 3: The impact of the quality of governance on firm valuation is greater in weaker 
legal regimes.  
III. Empirical Design and Data 
A. Regression Specification 
To investigate the relation between firm attributes and the quality of governance and their 
interaction with legal environment, we regress individual firms’ CLSA and S&P scores on 
measures of investment opportunities, needs for external financing, ownership concentration, and 
the strength of legal environment, while controlling for industry and other firm characteristics. 
Specifically, we estimate the following cross-sectional country-random effects regression,  
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where CORP_GOV is corporate governance or transparency scores; α, a constant; INV_OPP, 
investment opportunities; EXT_FIN, the need for external financing; OWN_CASH, concentration 
of cash flow rights; LEGAL, the strength of a country’s legal regime. INV_OPP*LEGAL, 
EXT_FIN*LEGAL, and OWN_CASH*LEGAL are interaction terms of legal regime with 
investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership concentration, respectively. Z are 
control variables; and d, industry dummy. And c stands for country; i, industry; j, firm; k, control 
variables; I, the number of industries; and K, the number of control variables.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Four different scores are used as a proxy for CORP_GOV: CLSA scores on the composite 
index, COMP, investor protection, PROTECT, and social awareness, SOCIAL, or S&P aggregate 
score, TRAN. Of the six CLSA governance categories, we single out PROTECT because it is the 
most direct measure of investor protection against theft and, hence, is more relevant to ownership 
concentration than COMP.  Ownership concentration is hypothesized to help improve investor 
protection; however, there is no obvious reason to expect firms with more concentrated 
ownership to disclose more and be more transparent. Since COMP includes measures of 
transparency, as well as investor protection and other governance categories, we expect 
OWN_CASH to be more closely related to PROTECT than to COMP.  SOCIAL is examined 
separately because it is distinct from (has low correlations with) other CLSA governance 
categories and corporate social responsibility receives much public attention. 
Specification [S1] is estimated by two separate regressions: one with INV_OPP and 
EXT_FIN, and another with OWN_CASH as independent variables. These variables are separated 
for two reasons. First, using all three variables in the same regression substantially reduces the 
sample size because ownership data are not available for a substantial part of our sample. Second, 
using all three as independent variables in addition to their interaction terms with LEGAL creates 
severe multi-collinearity. 
We estimate these regressions using country-random effects to take into account that 
observations on individual firms in a given country are not independent and that errors among 
observations are correlated.
21 Country-random effects specification is supported by the Breusch 
and Pagan (1980) test, which strongly rejects the hypothesis that the variation of random effects is 
zero. Moreover, our sample consists only of a sub-sample of the total population of countries and, 
thus, a random-effects specification is preferable (Greene (1997)).  
                                                 
21 Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) obtain a similar result under a more restrictive set of assumptions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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In testing the hypotheses concerning firm valuation and corporate governance, we again 
control for strength of legal environment, industry, and firm characteristics and estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression using country-random effects: 
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The inferences one can draw from these regressions are limited because of endogeneity and 
other econometric problems. To reduce endogeneity, we exercise care in choosing proxies for key 
variables and sample periods. For example, our measure of EXT_FIN is a projected need for 
external financing, not an outcome-based measure. We also choose different time periods to 
estimate the dependent and independent variables in [S1] and [S2]. In addition, we conduct 
various robustness checks for sample selection, endogeneity, regression model specification, and 
alternative definitions of main variables. We describe the results in Section V. 
B. Firm Variables and Data 
Because much of the firm-level data originate from financial statements and accounting 
practices that vary across countries, it is difficult to directly compare the data across countries. 
However, one of the key distinguishing characteristics in legal regimes is accounting standards; 
thus, the legal regime variable controls, to some extent, for their differences. Additionally, 
industry dummies help control for different accounting practices across industries.  Any 
remaining noise would weaken the power of our tests. Most of the firm-level data are obtained 
from Worldscope. All variables are measured in U.S. dollars. 
B.1 Investment Opportunities, External Financing, Ownership, and Valuation 
To measure investment opportunities, INV_OPP, we rely on past growth in sales because it is 
less affected by diversion, manipulation, and different accounting rules than are earnings. We 
estimate a two-year geometric average of annual percentage growth in net sales from 1998 to 
2000, and winsorize it at the 1
st and 99
th percentile. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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In estimating the need for external financing, EXT_FIN, we avoid an outcome-based measure 
to reduce endogeneity. We use an estimate of projected need for outside capital employed in 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), which measures the difference between required 
investment and internally available capital for investment. Required investment is estimated by a 
two-year geometric average of annual growth rate in total assets from 1998 to 2000; internally 
available capital for investment by a two-year average of ROE/(1-ROE) over the same period, 
where ROE is the rate of return on equity based on book value.
22 
For ownership concentration, we measure concentration of cash flow rights, OWN_CASH, as 
the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder in 1996 as defined in Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2002) (CDL). La Porta et al. (1998b, 2002), CDL, and Faccio and Lang 
(2002) emphasize the difference between control rights and cash flow rights. CDL show that firm 
value increases with cash flow rights (incentive effect) and decreases when control rights exceed 
cash flow rights (entrenchment effect). Control rights can exceed cash flow rights because of 
pyramidal structure, cross-holdings, and dual-class shares. For example, if the controlling 
shareholder owns ten percent of company A’s outstanding stocks, which in turn owns 30 percent 
of firm B’s stocks, then she is considered to control ten percent of firm B, the weakest link in the 
chain of control rights. However, the cash flow rights of firm B owned by the controlling 
shareholder is only three percent (10%×30%). 
Data on cash flow rights and control rights are obtained from Mara Faccio and Larry Lang. 
Their data overlap our sample for only 173 and 240 firms in 12 and 11 countries for CSLA and 
S&P samples, respectively.
23 Control rights of the largest stockholder exceed the cash flow rights 
in 40.7 percent of the sample firms. Average ownership of cash flow rights and control rights are 
21.07 percent and 25.83 percent, respectively. We define ownership wedge, WEDGE, as a 
                                                 
22 See Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) for assumptions and justifications for this measure. 
23 The countries are Australia, Brazil, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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dummy variable equal to one if control rights exceed cash flow rights by at least ten percent (19.3 
percent of the sample firms) and zero, otherwise.
24 
Firm valuation is measured as the 2000-to-2001 two-year average of Tobin’s Q. As in La 
Porta et al. (2002) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), we define Tobin’s Q as the sum of total 
assets plus the market value of equity less book value of equity, over total assets. The market 
value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding, times the year-end price.  
This measure of Q, however, may be distorted due to excessive consolidation when partially 
owned subsidiaries are treated as fully owned subsidiaries. Consolidation of financial statements 
may also affect our estimates of growth in sales and external financing needs. La Porta et al. 
(2002) make adjustments for the potential distortion in Q and compare unadjusted Q with the 
consolidation-adjusted Q. They find a correlation of 0.83 between the two measures and conclude 
the distortion is not material enough to base their statistical results on adjusted Q. Although we do 
not adjust for consolidation for the same reason, we check for its effects by adding a 
consolidation dummy equal to one if a firm consolidates its financial statements, and zero 
otherwise. The consolidation dummy also controls for the possibility that consolidation of 
financial statements makes the combined entity more transparent. 
As stated earlier, we separate time periods during which dependent and independent variables 
are measured to reduce endogeneity. Specifically, we use 2000 to 2001 to estimate two-year 
average Q, 2000 CLSA and S&P scores for CORP_GOV, and 1998 to 2000 to calculate two-year 
averages for INV_OPP and EXT_FIN, and 1996 for OWNERSHIP.  
B.2 Control variables 
Industry dummies (di) are included in regressions to account for differences in asset structure, 
accounting practice, government regulation, and competitiveness, all of which may affect 
                                                 
24 The results do not change when WEDGE is defined by a five percent difference between control rights 
and cash flow rights. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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corporate governance and firm valuation. We classify two-digit SIC industries into 13 groups as 
in Campbell (1996).
25 
Firm size, SIZE, is defined as the logarithm of sales. We use sales because they are less 
sensitive to differences in accounting standards across countries. Because larger firms tend to 
attract more attention and may be under greater scrutiny by the public, size may affect 
governance structure. Size also proxies for firm age; older and larger firms tend to have higher 
book-to-market value ratio. 
Research and development expenditure scaled by sales, R&D, is used to control for 
differences in intangibility of corporate resources, which may be related to cost of diversion.  
Companies with high R&D expenditures also tend to be high-growth firms and may enjoy high 
valuation. 
Export intensity, EXPORT, is defined as sales revenue generated from shipping merchandise 
to foreign countries, scaled by sales. This measure is used to control for differences in exposure to 
globalization pressures in the product market. Companies that conduct more business globally 
may feel more pressure to conform their corporate governance to global standards (see Khanna, 
Kogan, and Palepu (2002)).  
If a firm has all major financial variables except for R&D and EXPORT, we set those two 
variables equal to zero; that is, we assume when a company does not report these variables it is 
because R&D spending or sales generated through export are negligible. Dropping companies 
with missing data for R&D and export would reduce our sample size considerably and may bias 
our sample towards technology-oriented firms. As a robustness check and as suggested by 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), we also use two dummy variables, which take values of 
one when a firm does not report R&D or export. These dummies control for the possibility that 
non-reporting firms are different from reporting firms. 
                                                 
25 See Table V for industry dummy classification. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Finally, ADR dummy variable is included to control for listing on U.S. stock exchanges. 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) provide evidence that ADR-listed foreign firms are valued 
higher. However, Siegel (2003) provides compelling evidence that it is not enforcement of U.S. 
securities law that causes the higher valuation. Since firms with high-quality accounting and 
governance practices are more likely to be ADR-listed, we expect ADR to be correlated with the 
CLSA governance and S&P transparency scores. The dummy variable is equal to one if a firm’s 
shares or its ADRs are listed on U. S. exchanges in either 1999 or 2000 (15.9 percent of the 
sample) and zero, otherwise. We exclude privately placed ADRs through Rule 144a and ‘Over-
the-Counter’ stocks.  
SIZE,  R&D, and EXPORT are two-year averages during 1999-2000. Table V provides a 
summary of variable definitions and data sources. 
B.3 Sample Construction 
For regression analyses we follow the usual practice of excluding financial institutions 
because of their unique financial structure, regulatory requirements, and accounting standards.
26 
This exclusion reduces our sample by 106 and 116 firms in CLSA and S&P samples, 
respectively. When companies’ identities are ambiguous, we check with the Internet Securities, 
Inc. (ISI) Emerging Markets database. We drop four and one firms in CLSA and S&P samples, 
because the ambiguity cannot be resolved, leaving 384 and 456 firms in the CLSA and S&P 
sample, respectively. Sample sizes are reduced further when relevant variables for each 
regression are unavailable from Worldscope. When INV_OPP and EXT_FIN enter as independent 
variables in [S1], 40 and 17 companies are dropped from CLSA and S&P samples due to missing 
data. One more firm is dropped from the S&P sample when Tobin’s Q is used in [S2] because of 
missing data.  
 
                                                 
26 We repeat all regressions including banks and financial firms with a financial dummy variable as a 
robustness check. The results are stronger due to larger sample sizes. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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C. Correlation between Main Variables 
Table VI reports correlations among main variables. Panel A shows both CLSA composite 
score, COMP, and investor protection, PROTECT, are positively correlated with Tobin’s Q. As 
expected, PROTECT is positively correlated with external financing, and firms with ADRs score 
significantly higher on COMP but not on PROTECT. The S&P aggregate transparency score, 
TRAN, is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q, measure of investment opportunities, firm size, 
and consolidation dummy, and is negatively correlated with firm export intensity.
27 
Panel B of the same table shows correlation coefficients between legal regime variables and 
firm-specific variables, which suggests that firms in countries with better investor protection and 
law enforcement are more reliant on external financing, enjoy higher valuation, and have lower 
ownership concentration. Firm size, R&D expenditures, exports intensity, and consolidation 
dummy are also correlated with Tobin’s Q, confirming our reasons to control for these variables 
in regression analyses. 
IV.  Empirical Results  
 
In this section we report country-random effects regression results. Estimates of [S1], the 
relation between CLSA or S&P scores with the three firm attributes and legal environment, are 
reported first, followed by the results on [S2], the relation between firm valuation and the 
governance or transparency scores. 
A. Relation between Governance and Firm Attributes 
A.1 Investment Opportunities and External Financing 
Table VII reports the results of regression [S1] with INV_OPP and EXT_FIN for COMP, 
PROTECT, SOCIAL, and TRAN. The results are supportive of our hypotheses. Both investment 
opportunities and external financing are significantly positively related to the composite index 
                                                 
27 Although the negative correlation between COMP and ownership concentration is surprising, it seems to 
be due to the low ownership concentration in strong legal regimes. There is a strong positive correlation 
between LEGAL and COMP. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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and investor protection. The strength of legal regimes, LEGAL, is also positively related to both 
scores. 
The interaction terms of legal regime with investment opportunities and external financing 
show negative coefficients, with three of four being significant. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that positive relations for investment opportunities and external financing are 
stronger in weaker legal environment. The results with the S&P score as the dependent variable 
also are largely consistent with those of the CLSA scores.  
When social awareness is used as the dependent variable, however, none of the independent 
variables of interest are significant, except for external financing which shows an opposite sign. 
There is no evidence that firms are more socially responsible when they have better investment 
opportunities or need more external financing. 
Results on ADR and consolidation dummies are also revealing. ADR listing seems to be 
highly related to firms’ overall governance practices, but not with investor protection. This lack 
of relation between ADR and investor protection is consistent with Siegel’s (2003) finding that 
investors of ADR listed firms do not benefit from U.S. securities regulation.
28 The consolidation 
dummy shows a similar pattern. Its coefficient is positive and significant for the composite score, 
but that is driven mainly through transparency. This result confirms the notion that firms 
consolidating their financial statements tend to be more transparent.  
The results on EXPORT and SIZE are difficult to interpret. Export intensity is significantly 
negatively related to COMP and TRAN. This is contrary to the notion that more export-oriented 
firms face greater pressure to improve their governance and disclosure practices to meet global 
                                                 
28 Although the results are not reported to save space, we relate the ADR dummy to the remaining five 
CLSA categories and find that ADR listing is significantly related to only those categories related to 
measures of transparency (transparency). When ADR is related to the three individual S&P categories, it is 
significantly related to only financial and accounting transparency (disclosure) but not to the transparency 
of ownership or board structures (ownership or board). These results suggest that relatively transparent 
firms with good accounting practices tend to list their shares in the U.S. through ADR; however, the same 
cannot be said for firms that practice good governance in terms of investor protection, managerial 
discipline, or board independence. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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standards. A plausible, albeit cynical, interpretation is that firms with more export/import 
businesses can more easily (less costly) divert resources overseas through inflated invoices and 
rebates and, thus, have incentives to be more opaque in their business practices. Larger firms tend 
to have better overall governance and disclosure practices, but they seem to provide less investor 
protection.  
A.2 Within-Country Variation Revisited 
In Section I, we document that controlling for legal environment, within-country variation in 
the quality of governance is greater in weaker legal regimes. The evidence presented in the 
preceding section provides a better specification to estimate within-country variation, allowing 
for a reexamination. We use Glejser (1969) test and estimate the regression:
29 
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The Glejser test is then the t-test that the coefficient on LEGAL is zero. Panel B of Table IV 
reports the results. For all the three measures of corporate governance and transparency the 
coefficient on LEGAL is negative and significant. This reconfirms our earlier finding that firms 
located in weaker legal regimes show greater variation in governance and disclosure practice.
30 
A.3.  Ownership 
The regression results of [S1] with ownership concentration are reported in Table VIII. The 
regressions contain the OWNERSHIP
2  term to account for possible non-linearity between 
                                                 
29 Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2002) use this test to investigate firm variability in output as a function of 
CEO power in the U.S. 
30 We also conduct the Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) test of the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals 
of the above regression for the weak and strong legal regime sub-samples are equal. The results are 
consistent with those of the Glejser test. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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ownership concentration and corporate governance as in McConnell and Servaes (1990) and 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999). It also contains WEDGE to account for differences in 
cash flow rights and control rights. We exclude companies with control rights less than five 
percent because it is not possible to identify the controlling shareholder in those cases.  
As mentioned earlier, the sample size for ownership data is small to start with, and gets even 
smaller when we exclude financial firms. Without financial firms we have only 124 and 177 firms 
for an average of 10 and 16 firms per country for CLSA and S&P samples, respectively. To 
alleviate this small sample size problem, we add back financial firms and estimate [S1] with a 
financial industry dummy variable. The results are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports results 
without financial firms. 
Panel A shows a significant positive coefficient on cash flow rights, OWN_CASH, and a 
significant negative coefficient on OWNERSHIP
2 for both COMP and PROTECT, suggesting that 
corporate governance improves with the concentration of ownership but at a decreasing rate. This 
is consistent with earlier findings of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), who argue that greater ownership concentration by insiders may align their 
interests with those of minority shareholders, but it also may result in a greater degree of 
managerial entrenchment. 
When COMP is the dependent variable, the coefficients for WEDGE and the interaction term 
between  OWN_CASH and LEGAL are negative as expected but insignificant. This lack of 
significance is not surprising. As discussed earlier in Section III.A, there is no reason to expect 
firms with more concentrated ownership to disclose more or to be more transparent, although 
shareholders are expected to be less subject to agency conflicts and enjoy greater protection. 
COMP includes measures of transparency as well as investor protection. 
When the investor protection score, PROTECT, is used as the dependent variable, all 
coefficients have the right signs and significant, including WEDGE and the interaction term. 
These results imply that investor protection improves with the concentration of cash flow rights William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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but decreases as the controlling shareholder acquires more control rights in excess of her cash 
flow rights through pyramidal structure, cross holdings, and/or dual class shares.  
The negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term indicates that the positive 
relation between cash flow rights and investor protection is stronger in weaker legal regimes. This 
finding is consistent with our hypothesis that in weaker legal regimes concentrated ownership of 
cash flow rights becomes a more important tool to resolve agency conflict between controlling 
and minority shareholders. 
When we use S&P transparency score as the dependent variables all the coefficients have the 
right signs but most of them lose significance. This lack of significance is not surprising as there 
is no reason to expect firms with concentrated ownership to disclose more. Finally, we repeat all 
the regressions excluding financial firms (Panel B). The results become weaker because of 
smaller sample sizes. However, the signs of coefficients are mostly in the right direction, and the 
results with PROTECT are the strongest, as expected. 
In sum, the regression estimates of [S1] suggest that not only difference in legal environment 
matters, but firm-level differences in growth opportunity, external financing, and ownership 
concentration also matter in a firm’s choice of governance practice. More important, these firm 
attributes matter more as the legal environment becomes less investor friendly. 
B. Relation between Valuation and Governance  
To investigate the relation between corporate governance practices and firm valuation, we 
estimate regression specification [S2] with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Independent 
variables are CLSA or S&P scores, legal regime, an interaction term of legal regime with 
corporate governance or disclosure scores, past sales growth, firm size, R&D expenditures, 
export, and ADR and consolidation dummies. Past sales growth is added to control for a possible 
spurious relation between corporate governance and valuation because growth opportunities are 
related to both valuation and corporate governance. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table IX reports results based on CLSA and S&P scores. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
firms with higher-quality corporate governance are valued higher. The CLSA composite score is 
positively related with firm valuation, as is the measure of investor protection. The social 
awareness score again shows no relation to valuation, providing no evidence that investors value 
what CLSA defines as corporate social responsibility. 
LEGAL also has the expected positive sign, consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. 
(2002) that firms located in better legal environments enjoy higher valuation. However, when it 
enters the regression along with either CLSA or S&P scores (Panel A), its coefficient becomes 
insignificant. Only when the same regression is estimated without governance or transparency 
scores (Panel B), does the coefficient on LEGAL become significant.  It appears that CLSA and 
S&P scores provide extra information relevant for valuation that is not contained in the measure 
of the quality of legal environment.  
The interaction term with LEGAL has the expected negative sign for COMP, PROTECT, and 
TRAN, and is significant for two out of three. These results are consistent with our conjecture that 
the positive relation between corporate governance and valuation is weaker in stronger legal 
regimes. This may explain why previous studies based on data from U.S. firms, which are located 
in one of the strongest legal frameworks, show mixed results on the relation between firm 
valuation and corporate governance. 
Most of the control variables are of expected sign and highly significant. Firms with high 
growth opportunities are valued higher as are firms of smaller size, greater R&D expenditures, 
and more export orientation. The results also show no incremental ADR effect on firm valuation 
beyond the corporate governance and disclosure scores. Interestingly, La Porta et al. (2002) find 
no valuation effect of ADR listing for firms in civil law countries and a small positive effect for 
common law countries. Finally, the significant negative coefficient on the consolidation dummy 
is consistent with our suspicion that excessive consolidation biases Tobin’s Q downward. 
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V. Robustness 
Our results remain robust to a battery of checks on the sample selection, endogeneity 
problems, regression model specification, alternative definitions of main variables, and outliers. 
A. Sample Selection 
As stated earlier, CLSA and S&P select firms based on size and investor interest, which 
makes our results subject to a sample selection problem. We address the size problem by 
repeating regressions in Tables VII, VIII, and IX using the Heckman (1979) two-step selection 
model.
31 We find virtually no change in the magnitude or the significance of the coefficients and 
therefore conclude the results are robust to the sample selection problem.
32 
B. Endogeneity 
Although our results are consistent with the predictions of the model, there is endogeneity 
problem in the regression analyses. In specification [S1] it is possible that good corporate 
governance leads to greater sales growth rather than good investment opportunities leading to 
good governance practice. Another plausible story is that companies that enjoy greater sales 
growth tend to be rated higher by CLSA; precisely why all the tests also are conducted with S&P 
data that are free from such subjectivity. Endogeneity is of less concern regarding external 
financing because our variable is the projected need, not outcome-based. We also are less 
concerned with ownership concentration because it is hard, at least for us, to build a plausible 
scenario of how good investor protection leads to more concentrated ownership.  
                                                 
31 Heckman’s selection model assumes that an underlying regression relation exists (in our case either 
Specification [S1] or [S2]) but the dependent variables are not always observed. The variables are observed 
if γ × SIZEj + uj > 0 (selection equation), where γ is the selection equation coefficient, and the error term, uj, 
is normally distributed with zero mean and variance equal to one. If the error term in [S1] or [S2], 
1 j ε  or 
2 j ε , is correlated with the error term of the selection equation, uj, then standard regression techniques 
applied to [S1] and [S2] yield biased results. Heckman’s selection model provides consistent, 
asymptotically efficient estimates for all the parameters in a model. We estimate the selection equation 
using all companies covered by Worldscope for our sample countries that have sales data, the proxy for 
size, in either 1999 or 2000. There are 5,466 and 8,260 such companies for countries covered by CLSA and 
S&P. The coefficient on SIZE in the selection equation is positive and significant in all specifications 
indicating that larger firms are more likely to be included in CLSA and S&P samples. 
32 Results are available upon request. We do not control for investor interest because it is difficult to find a 
proxy. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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On Specification [S2] one might argue that analysts assign higher governance scores to firms 
that enjoy high valuation rather than corporate governance being priced in the stock market. In 
anticipation of such an argument, we check the CLSA results with S&P data as a robustness 
check.  
We nevertheless address the endogeneity issue more formally by estimating [S1] and [S2] as 
a system of simultaneous equations using a three-stage least squares method.
33 While  this 
estimation technique allows for endogeneity between governance and valuation, we need to 
identify some exogenous parameters that only affect either governance or valuation, but not both. 
Identifying truly exogenous parameters is difficult; therefore, the results presented below must be 
interpreted with caution.  
In the three-stage least squares estimation, the governance equation contains COMP, 
PROTECT, or TRANS, as the dependent variable, and Q as a simultaneously determined variable. 
We use the same set of control parameters used in Table VII excluding industry dummies and 
interaction terms. Although not reported, the coefficients on industry dummies are jointly 
insignificant in regressions reported in Table VII, suggesting that R&D expenditures, export 
intensity, and size in the governance equation control for difference in tangibility and other facets 
of industry classification that may affect governance. Thus, we assume that industry classification 
does not affect governance but does affect valuation. We also control for firms’ ALPHA and 
BETA values in Worldscope computed over 23 and 35 consecutive month-end percentage price 
changes relative to a local market index during years from 1999 to 2001. To the extent that 
ALPHA proxies for excess returns, higher ALPHA values may make the controlling shareholder 
more willing to practice good governance. If higher market risk proxied by BETA provides better 
                                                 
33  A similar approach is used by Lins (2003) to address endogeneity problems arising in the relation 
between ownership and valuation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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opportunities for the controlling shareholder to profit from inside information, high BETA may be 
negatively related to the quality of governance.
34 
The valuation equation contains Q as the dependent variable, governance or disclosure scores 
as a simultaneously determined variable, and the same control parameters as the governance 
equation, adding industry dummies and excluding EXT_FIN, size, ALPHA, and BETA. As in 
previous studies (see Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Lins (2003)), we assume that ALPHA 
and  BETA affect governance but not valuation. We also assume that size has no further 
incremental effect on valuation after controlling for R&D expenditures and growth opportunities 
(see Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia  (1999) for possible justifications). 
Table X reports three-stage estimation results for COMP (Panel A), PROTECT (Panel B), and 
TRAN (Panel C).
35 The results are consistent with those reported in Tables VII and IX. Both 
INV_OPP and EXT_FIN are positively and significantly related to governance and disclosure 
practices in all panels, except for INV_OPP in Panel B, which shows the right sign but is not 
significant. Furthermore, CORP_GOV is positive and significant in valuation equations in all 
panels.
36  
Therefore, to the extent that three-stage least squares controls for simultaneity between 
governance and valuation, we conclude that companies with better investment opportunities and 
greater need for external financing practice better governance and disclose more, in turn leading 
to higher valuation. 
C. Alternative Variables and Regression Specifications 
Our results are also robust to alternative definitions of independent variables or to added 
control variables. It is possible, for instance, that governance and transparency scores are more 
related to other proxies of legal environment than to investor protection and rule of law. Several 
                                                 
34 Data availability for ALPHA and BETA from Worldscope yield 302 and 296 firms for CLSA and S&P 
samples, respectively. 
35 Including interaction terms would require specifying more exogenous parameters. Hence, we exclude 
interaction terms from the three-stage least squares estimation. 
36 When we use country fixed effects without LEGAL our three-stage estimation results do not change.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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alternative variables are used to measure de jure protection of capital suppliers and de facto 
enforcement, and the conclusions do not change.
37  
Our investment opportunities are measured by past growth in sales. When we replace it with  
a more direct measure of investment profitability, return on invested capital as defined by 
Worldscope, our results do not change. As mentioned earlier, we instrument current values of 
INV_OPP and EXT_FIN by their lagged values to reduce endogeneity. Using contemporaneous 
measures does not change our findings. The findings also remain valid when we include a dummy 
variable equal to one when R&D or export data is missing. 
Finally, CLSA investor protection score, PROTECT, contains one and six companies scoring 
zero (minimum possible) and 100 (maximum possible), respectively. Since this score is truncated, 
a limited dependent variable approach (Tobit regression) may be more appropriate for 
Specification [S1]. The results in Tables VII and VIII do not change if we use Tobit regression. 
D. Outliers 
To reduce the effects of outliers, all but corporate governance and disclosure scores are 
calculated as two-year averages. In addition, INV_OPP, EXT_FIN, and Q are winsorized at the 1
st 
and 99
th percentile because these variables take extreme values for some firms. As an additional 
check, we apply different methodologies to trim outliers: Hadi’s (1994) multivariate method 
(with a percent cut-off) and Cook’s D statistics. Finally, several countries contain data for only a 
few companies. We rerun all regressions dropping countries with fewer than 3 firms.
38   None of 
these procedures change the results.
39 
 
                                                 
37 Specifically, we follow the principal component analysis outlined in Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 
(2002) and combine investor and creditor protection to construct a single capital providers’ protection 
index; for enforcement, we combine efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, absence of corruption, 
risk of expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation to derive a single index.
 See La Porta et al. (1998a) 
for definitions of these variables.   
38 Argentina, Columbia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Peru, Poland, and Russia are dropped from the 
CLSA sample, and New Zealand from the S&P sample. 
39 Results of the robustness checks are available from the authors upon request William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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V. Summary and Implications 
This paper analyzes how firm attributes are related to a firms’ choice of governance practice 
and interact with legal environment. With a simple model we demonstrate that growth 
opportunities, need for external financing, and concentrated ownership lead to better governance 
practice and that the effects are stronger in weaker legal environments. We also show that firms 
with better governance are valued higher. 
These predictions are tested on two newly constructed sets of data on the quality of 
governance and disclosure practices. All regressions are estimated with control variables that 
include industry dummies, size, R&D expenditures, export intensity, and ADR and consolidation 
dummy variables. Consistent with the theory, all three firm attributes are positively related to the 
quality of governance and disclosure practices. 
The positive relations are stronger in countries with weaker legal frameworks. Apparently, 
firms in weak legal regimes structure their own governance practices to take advantage of better 
investment opportunities, as do firms with greater needs for external financing to overcome the 
adverse effects of poor legal protection on their ability to raise external capital. Firms also rely on 
ownership concentration to resolve agency conflict between controlling and other shareholders in 
response to weak investor protection. 
These results have implications for the debate concerning the Coase (1960) argument. While 
our results confirm the La Porta et al. (1998a) basic thesis that law matters for corporate 
governance, firms seem to adapt to poor legal frameworks to establish efficient governance 
practices.
40 
Although firms are valued higher in stronger legal environments, the relation becomes 
insignificant when the scores on the quality of governance and disclosure practices are accounted 
for in regression. Apparently, the scores reflect not only the quality of legal framework in which 
                                                 
40 See Johnson and Shleifer (2000) for a literature review on the debate concerning the Coase argument in 
corporate governance. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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firms are located, but also contain firm-specific information of importance to investors in 
assessing firm value. This result offers encouraging news to corporate decision makers, especially 
those located in weak legal regimes: By adopting sound governance and disclosure practices, they 
can help increase their shareholder wealth regardless of where they are located. 
The positive relation between firm valuation and the quality of governance and disclosure 
practice is weaker in stronger legal regimes. This may explain why previous studies based on 
U.S. data show mixed results, because the U.S. provides one of the strongest legal frameworks.  
One governance category consistently showing no relation to firm attributes or to firm 
valuation is social awareness. It seems as if firms do not become more socially responsible when 
they have better growth opportunities, need more external financing, or have higher ownership 
concentration, perhaps because they believe social responsibility is not important to investors. 
Indeed, we find no evidence that investors value what CLSA defines as social awareness—
measures of child labor practices, political legitimacy, environmental responsibility, equal 
employment policy, and ethical behavior. Several of these measures are quite contentious. For 
example, economists debate whether child labor in low-income economies is damaging to those 
societies as the alternatives could be starvation, prostitution, or drug peddling. 
Our results imply that economic policies play an important role in guiding firms toward good 
governance practices. Policy makers often debate the merits of pro-growth versus redistribution 
policies. One important consequence they must consider in this debate is that pro-growth policies 
generate more profitable investment opportunities and stimulate external financing needs of 
corporations. Both of these conditions provide controlling shareholders incentives to improve 
governance practices. In short, pro-growth policies encourage voluntary improvement in 
corporate governance, whereas redistribution oriented policies discourage it. In addition, 
redistribution policies tend to weaken property rights, reducing the incentives to increase cash 
flow rights for controlling shareholders. Any tax increase for redistribution purposes also William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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decreases the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Such reductions in cash flow rights 
increase agency conflicts and may weaken investor protection.  
Our results also have implications for the debate on whether globalization leads to 
convergence in corporate governance (see Bebchuk and Roe (1999), Coffee (1999), Berglöf and 
von Thadden (2000), Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2002)). With the increasing globalization of 
trade and capital flows, national boundaries and legal jurisdictions are becoming less effective in 
defining corporate behavior, making individual firm attributes more relevant in shaping corporate 
governance. According to our results, firms with better growth opportunities, greater need for 
external financing, and higher ownership concentration located in countries with pro-growth 
economic policies are more likely to converge toward the global standard. 
Finally, caveats are in order. Although we have attempted to address endogeneity, a full 
treatment requires time-series analyses of changes in corporate governance practices, a task we 
plan to pursue upon sufficient accumulation of data over time. On the theoretical level, we are 
able to identify three firm attributes related to corporate governance; however, further research 
may reveal the existence of other variables of greater importance. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Appendix A: A Model with Diversion Occurring after Investments 
If the controlling shareholder diverts resources after investments are made, she will take all positive 
NPV projects because it will increase both her share of liquidating dividends and the amount of diversion.  
Thus the pre-diversion value of the firm is  2 / ) 1 ( 2
0 π π π
π
+ = − + = Π ∫ dj j . Her decision is then to 
maximize α (1−d) Π +  d Π − C, where C is the total dollar cost of diversion.  
We assume C is convex in both the fraction, d, and the pre-diversion value of the firm Π.     Previous 
authors also have assumed a convex cost function in d (e.g., Johnson et al. (2000), Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon (2002), and Doidge, Kalolyi, and Stulz (2003)), with the rationale that hiding larger amounts 
of diversion gets increasingly harder as diversion increases. Notice that the amount of diversion is a 
function of both the fraction d and the size of the firm. Thus we assume C = 
p d c ) ( Π , where p > 1. 
Another justification for this assumption is that larger firms tend to attract more investor interest and 
hence are under greater public scrutiny. 
Solving for the first order condition with this cost function, we obtain: 
() 1 1 0 −− − = α ΠΠ pcd p p ,       [ A 1 ]  
where the marginal benefit of diversion, (1-α), the minority shareholders’ wealth loss, is equal to the 
marginal cost. The second order condition is satisfied because −− − < pp c d p p () 1 2 0 Π . From the first 
order condition we obtain the optimal diversion: 
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Equations [A3] through [A6] are consistent with Equations [6] through [9]. Finally, the market value, 
(1-d)Π , is decreasing in d*. Therefore, we obtain Hypotheses 1 through 5, and 7 stated in the text. 
Appendix B: Relation between External Financing and Corporate Governance 
Consider a firm that has decided to invest I but has no assets or internal funds to finance it. The firm’s 
value derives solely from the net present value of the project requiring I,  of which the controlling 
shareholder owns α fraction. The project is financed by proceeds from selling 1-β fraction of the firm to 
other investors. The firm must raise I/(1-d) such that when the controlling shareholder diverts dI/(1-d), the 
firm will be left with I for investment. Under these assumptions the controlling shareholder’s payoff is 
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Since new investors earn only the equilibrium rate of return on their investment, which is zero by 
assumption, 
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 Substituting equation [B2] to equation [B1],  
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Differentiating [B3] with respect to d,
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If c > 1 - α, equation [B4] is negative and the optimal d = 0. When the cost of diversion, c, is greater than 
the wealth transfer from the existing shareholders, 1 – α, the controlling shareholder will find it optimal 
not to divert any corporate resources. 
If c < 1 – α, equation [B4] is positive and there is an incentive to maximize d. As can be seen from 
equation [B2], however, increasing d means the controlling shareholder must sell a greater fraction of the 
firm, decreasing her ownership of the firm, αβ. Because she will lose control of the firm when β falls 
below a certain point, the maximum fraction of the firm she sells to new investors is bounded by a 
minimum βmin, below which the controlling shareholder loses the control of the firm.
42   Substituting βmin 
into equation [B2], we obtain: 
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Since I is the amount of external financing needed, taking partial derivative of d* with respect to I, 
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Thus, the need for external financing is inversely related to d*. 
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Figure 1. Optimal Diversion, Investments, and Market Values for a Firm with a Maximum Rate of Return π   
 
This figure presents the investment opportunity set for a firm with an initial endowment equal to π .  The area  0 ) 1 ( BC π +  is equal to the firm’s market value, 
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Figure 2. A Controlling Shareholder’s Payoff as a Function of Diversion, d, with Different Investment Profitability and Legal Regimes 
 
This graph plots a controlling shareholder’s pay-off as a function of diversion d for the same ownership α = 0.3, excess cash e = 0, and different cost of diversion c and profitability of investment opportunity, π . 
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Table I 
Relation between Corporate Scandals, CLSA Composite Score, and Control 
Variables 
 
This table presents the results of country-random effects regression of the number of scandals on CLSA composite governance 
score, COMP, and control variables. We count the number of articles appearing in Lexis-Nexis containing negative information, 
such as assets expropriation, accounting misreporting, earnings manipulation, stock price manipulation, insider trading, share 
dilution, and undertaking illegal projects during the period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001. In Panel A, we control for 
the quality of legal environment, LEGAL, which is defined as INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where INVESTOR is the anti-director 
index, and ENFORCE is rule of law, and the log of the total number of articles, TOTAL. In Panel B, we also control for the number 
of newspapers per capita, NEWS, defined in Dyck and Zingales (2002). NEWS is not defined for China and India. The sample 
consists of the top three and bottom three CLSA composite score firms in each country containing more than 11 firms. These 
countries are: Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Turkey. The total number of articles covered is 29,320. The number of articles with scandals is 49. If the same 
scandal appears in multiple articles we count it only once. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null 
hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are 
in boldface. Refer to Table V for definitions of variables. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Number of 
Scandals 
Panel A  Panel B 
COMP  -0.023 -0.017 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
LEGAL  0.003 -0.015 
  (0.82) (0.15) 
NEWS  - 0.017 
   (0.75) 
TOTAL  0.157 0.088 
  (0.01) (0.08) 
Wald-test statistics of overall significance  19.960 23.340 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.193 0.259 
Number of observations  84 72 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table II 
Correlation Coefficients between Categories of CLSA Governance and S&P Transparency Scores 
 
 
This table reports correlation coefficients between different categories of CLSA and S&P samples. CLSA sample size is 494 companies. S&P sample size is 573 companies. All correlation coefficients 
are simple correlation coefficients, except those between CLSA and S&P categories. The correlation coefficients between S&P and CLSA categories are Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients 
and are based on 208 companies present in both samples.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the 
ten percent level (based on two-tail test) are in bold face. COMP is defined as 0.15 × DISCIPLINE + 0.15 × TRANSP + 0.15 × INDEP + 0.15 × ACCOUNT + 0.15 × RESPON + 0.15 × PROTECT, 
where DISCIPLINE is a measure of managerial incentives and discipline towards value maximizing actions; TRANSP is a measure of timeliness and accuracy of financial information disclosure; INDEP 
is a measure of board independence; ACCOUNT is a measure of board accountability; RESPON is a measure of enforcement and management accountability; and PROTECT is a measure of minority 
shareholder protection. TRAN is defined as OWNERSHIP + DISCLOSURE + BOARD, where OWNERSHIP is the number of items disclosed on ownership structure and investor relations; 
DISCLOSURE, on financial transparency and information disclosure; and BOARD, on board and management structure and processes. 
 
 
CLSA  Governance Scores  S&P Transparency Rankings   
TRANSP INDEP ACCOUNT RESPON PROTECT  SOCIAL  COMP  OWNERSHIP  DISCLOSURE  BOARD  TRAN  
                  CLSA Governance 
Scores 
0.19  0.27  0.26 0.35 0.23 0.21  0.59  -0.08 -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  DISCIPLINE 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.23)  (0.64)  (0.91)  (0.72)   
  0.18  0.23 0.34 0.13 0.05  0.53 0.13  0.17 0.11  0.15  TRANSP 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.23)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.03)   
   0.21 0.36 0.29 0.05  0.66  0.08 -0.11  0.06  0.03 INDEP 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23)  (0.00)  (0.24)  (0.11)  (0.42)  (0.63)   
    0.28  0.06  0.24 0.53  -0.02 0.07  0.18  0.10  ACCOUNT 
      (0.00) (0.19) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.75)  (0.33)  (0.01)  (0.16)   
      0.40  0.02  0.73 0.15  0.28 0.21  0.24  RESPON 
        (0.00)  (0.69)  (0.00) (0.03)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)   
        0.02  0.62 0.18  0.06  0.24 0.20  PROTECT 
        (0.60)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.40)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
         0.15 -0.25  -0.16  0.004  -0.12  SOCIAL 
         (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.95)  (0.08)   
           0.15 0.13  0.22  0.20  COMP 
           (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
                   S&P Transparency 
Rankings 
             0.61 0.62  0.85  OWNERSHIP 
             (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
               0.57 0.82  DISCLOSURE 
               (0.00)  (0.00)   
                 0.89  BOARD 
                 ( 0 . 0 0 )    
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Table III 
Summary Statistics of Legal Regime Variables, CLSA Composite Governance Score and S&P Transparency Ranking by Country 
 
This table reports the legal regime variables, the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of CLSA composite corporate governance scores, COMP, and S&P transparency rankings, 
TRAN, by country. ORIGIN is legal origin; INVESTOR is the anti-director index; ENFORCE is rule of law; LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE.  N is number of firms in the country. Refer to Table 
V for definitions of variables. “na” stands for “not available”. 
 
 
 
Legal regime variables 
  
CLSA composite governance score, COMP  S&P transparency ranking, TRAN 
Country   ORIGIN INVESTOR  ENFORCE LEGAL  Mean  St. Dev. Min  Max  N  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max  N 
Argentina Civil  (French)  4  8.33  33.32  60.00  .  60.00 60.00  1  23.44  8.37  12.00  35.00  9 
Australia  Common  4 10.00  40.00 .  .  .  .  . 56.69  7.19  37.00  66.00  26 
Brazil  Civil  (French)  3  3.33  9.99  53.76 7.97  38.78 68.22  30  27.30 10.46 16.00 51.00  30 
Chile  Civil  (French)  5  8.33  41.65  57.02 5.38  43.40 65.04  16  29.44 10.48 13.00 50.00  18 
China  Civil  (German)  1  8.13  8.13  43.56  11.24  21.62 64.50  25  41.88 10.14 24.00 56.00  16 
Columbia  Civil  (French)  3  2.64  7.92  47.87  .  47.87 47.87  1 . . . . . 
Czech Rep.  Civil (German)  2  8.33  16.66  51.42  .  51.42 51.42  1  .  .  .  .  . 
Greece Civil  (French)  2  5.07  10.14  52.11 5.15  48.47 55.76  2  .  .  .  .  . 
Hong Kong   Common  5  8.33  41.65  56.28  11.37  35.04 83.49  38  41.76  4.02  33.00  54.00  42 
Hungary  Civil  (German)  3  8.61  25.83  49.49  8.33  43.61 55.38  2 . . . . . 
India Common  5  6.67  33.35  47.58  10.03  29.10 83.27  79  33.66  9.58  15.00  55.00  41 
Indonesia Civil  (French)  2  3.33  6.66  33.56  11.00 10.59 56.57  18  32.73  6.36  22.00  43.00  11 
Japan Civil  (German)  4  9.24 36.96  .  .  .  .  .  44.30  7.87  19.00  59.00 150 
Korea  Civil  (German)  2  6.67  13.34  38.57 6.35  29.70 52.86  24  39.49 10.25 12.00 54.00  47 
Malaysia Common  4  5.28  21.12  50.65  13.65  19.47 72.83  47  39.54  6.73  30.00  56.00  50 
Mexico Civil  (French)  1  3.33  3.33  55.68 7.30  43.55 63.96  8  22.81 8.37  13.00 47.00  16 
New  Zealand  Common  4 10.00  40.00 .  .  .  .  . 51.00  .  51.00  51.00  1 
Pakistan Common  5  5.00  25.00  27.83  12.71  15.53 60.02  11  31.56  6.71  20.00  43.00  9 
Peru Civil  (French)  3  5.00  15.00  68.84  .  68.84 68.84  1 19.00  3.56  16.00  26.00 7 
Philippines Civil  (French)  3  5.90  17.70  36.03  12.16  17.46 57.92  20  23.44  5.73  11.00  30.00  9 
Poland  Civil  (German)  3  7.15  21.45  34.53  0.81  33.96 35.10  2 . . . . . 
Russia  Civil  (na)  5  5.00  25.00  13.77  .  13.77 13.77  1 . . . . . 
Singapore Common  4  10.00  40.00  59.05  8.45  40.83 77.37  43  51.27  8.33  28.00  68.00  26 
South  Africa  Common  5  3.54  17.70  61.01  7.96  38.36 75.90  40  . . . . . 
Taiwan Civil  (German)  3  6.67  20.01  47.16 8.85  25.80 67.07  47  18.33  6.23  13.00 31.00  39 
Thailand  Common  2  8.33  16.66  48.58  12.31  25.50 71.12  20  42.08 11.54 15.00 57.00  26 
Turkey  Civil  (French)  2  6.04  12.08  36.23  9.87  21.09 51.09  17  . . . . . 
Average     3.30 6.60  22.25  47.11 . . .  Total: 494 35.25       Total: 573William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table IV 
The Relation between Conditional Variation in CLSA Governance and S&P Transparency Scores and the Quality of Legal 
Environment 
 
This table reports the results of the regression: 
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where u ˆ  are the fitted values of the residuals from the regression  
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In these regressions c indexes country; i indexes industry; and j indexes firm. CORP_GOV is one of CLSA corporate governance scores (COMP or PROTECT) in 2000 or S&P 
transparency rankings (TRAN). d are industry dummies (coefficients are not reported). INV_OPP (investment opportunities) is 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average of growth rate in 
net sales (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); EXT_FIN (external financing need) is the difference between 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average growth rate in total assets 
minus 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average maximum sustainable growth rate, where the latter is equal to ROE/(1 - ROE), and ROE (return on equity) is net income over book value 
of  equity (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where INVESTOR (investor protection) is the anti-director index, and ENFORCE (enforcement) 
is rule of law. Z are control variables: SIZE is log of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year 
average; EXPORT is export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm’s shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in either 1999 or 
2000, and zero, otherwise; and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm consolidates its financial statements, and zero, otherwise.  UCOMP, UPROTECT, and UTRAN are the fitted 
values of the residuals obtained from the first-stage regressions, where the dependent variables are COMP, PROTECT, and TRAN, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are probability 
levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. In Panel A we 
control only for LEGAL and drop countries that contain fewer than ten firms. Those countries are: Argentina, Columbia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, 
Poland, and Russia (CLSA sample) and Argentina, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, and Philippines (S&P sample). In Panel B, we control for other relevant variables and drop firms that 
belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67). We also drop firms from the sample (Panel B) if they do not have one of the following items in a given year of interest: total 
assets, sales, total assets, book value of equity, or net income. If all items, except for R&D expenditures and export, are available, we set those two equal to zero. Refer to Table V for 
definitions of variables.  
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
Dependent Variable  |UCOMP| |UPROTECT| |UTRAN| |UCOMP| |UPROTECT| |UTRAN| 
INV_OPP  - - -  1.795 -0.718  1.221 
      (0.14) (0.72)  (0.51) 
EXT_FIN  - - -  1.268 0.037  0.169 
      (0.11) (0.98)  (0.92) 
LEGAL  -0.080  -0.379    -0.099  -0.061 -0.400  -0.113 
  (0.01)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.07) (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE  - - -  0.377  1.207  -0.255 
      (0.20) (0.02)  (0.20) 
R&D  -  -  -  -40.779  -6.682 0.829 
      (0.06) (0.86)  (0.95) 
EXPORT  - - -  0.712  8.089  -1.359 
      (0.75) (0.03)  (0.55) 
ADR  - - -  -0.737 -1.198  1.349 
      (0.49) (0.50)  (0.10) 
CONSOL  - - -  1.682  -1.835 0.911 
      (0.10) (0.27)  (0.37) 
F-test statistics of overall significance  7.760 73.720  17.540 1.610 4.620  2.360 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.016 0.135 0.032 0.090 0.223  0.101 
Number of Companies  475 475 538 344 344  439 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table V 
 Variables, Definitions, and Source 
Variable  Notation  Definitions and Sources 
CLSA Governance and 
S&P Transparency Scores 
  
Investor Protection  PROTECT  Measure of minority shareholder protection. Source: 2000 CLSA Corporate Governance Scores. Range: 0-100. 
Composite   COMP  Defined as 0.15 × DISCIPLINE + 0.15 × TRANSP + 0.15 × INDEP + 0.15 × ACCOUNT + 0.15 × RESPON + 0.15 × PROTECT, where DISCIPLINE is a measure of 
managerial incentives and discipline towards value maximizing actions; TRANSP is a measure of timeliness and accuracy of financial information disclosure; INDEP is 
a measure of board independence; ACCOUNT is a measure of board accountability; RESPON is a measure of enforcement and management accountability; and 
PROTECT is a measure of minority shareholder protection. Source: 2000 CLSA Corporate Governance Scores. Range: 0-90. 
Social Awareness  SOCIAL  Measure of social responsibility. Source: 2000 CLSA Corporate Governance Scores. Range: 0-100. 
Transparency  TRAN  It is equal to OWNERSHIP + DISCLOSURE + BOARD, where OWNERSHIP is the number of items disclosed on ownership structure and investor relations; 
DISCLOSURE, on financial transparency and information disclosure; and BOARD, on board and management structure and processes. Source: 2000 S&P Transparency 
Rankings. Range: 0-91. 
Scandal Index  SCAND  The number of articles in Lexis-Nexis containing negative information about a firm, such as assets expropriation, accounting misreporting, earnings manipulation, 
stock price manipulation, insider trading, share dilution, and undertaking illegal projects during the period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001.  
Firm-level Variables    
Valuation  Q  The 2000-to-2001 two-year average of Tobin’s Q, which is the sum of total assets plus market value of common stock less book value of equity over total assets. The 
market value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding times year-end price. Source: Worldscope. 
Investment opportunity  INV_OPP  1998-2000 two-year geometric average growth rate in net sales. Source: Worldscope.  
Need for external financing  EXT_FIN  External financing need is defined as the difference between 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average growth rate in total assets less 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric 
average of the maximum sustainable growth rate, where the latter is equal to ROE / (1 - ROE) and ROE is the return on equity (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998) for details). Source: Worldscope.  
Cash flow rights  OWN_CASH  The share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder as defined in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2002) in 1996.  
Ownership wedge  WEDGE  Dummy variable, equal to one if CONTROL - OWNER_CASH ≥ 10% and zero, otherwise. CONTROL is the share of voting rights held by the largest shareholder as 
defined in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2002) in 1996. 
Size  SIZE  Logarithm of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year averages. Source: Worldscope. 
R&D expenditures  R&D  Research and development expenditures over sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year averages. Source: Worldscope. 
Export intensity  EXPORT  Export over sales, 1999-2000 average. Export is the revenues generated from shipment of merchandise to another country for sale. Source: Worldscope. 
ADR dummy  ADR  Dummy variable, equal to one if a firm’s shares are listed on U.S. exchanges in either 1999 or 2000 and zero, otherwise. We exclude privately placed ADRs through 
Rule 144a and ‘Over-the-Counter’ stocks. Source: Bank of New York. 
Consolidation dummy  CONSOL  Dummy variable, equal to one if Worldscope states that (i) “all subsidiaries are consolidated;” (ii) “domestic subsidiaries are consolidated, others on cost basis;” (iii) 
“consolidation for significant subsidiaries, others are on an equity basis;” (iv) “consolidation for significant subsidiaries, others are on cost basis;”  (v) “consolidation, 
except for financial services subsidiaries, which are on equity basis;” (vi) “consolidation for significant subsidiaries, others on equity or proportional basis;” and  0, 
otherwise. When this information is missing in Worldscope, we rely on firms’ annual reports. For specifications [S1] and [S2] we use information based on financial 
statements in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Source: Worldscope and firms’ annual reports.  
Industry dummies  d  Industries as defined in Campbell (1996): petroleum (SIC 13, 29), consumer durables (SIC 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57), basic industry (SIC 8, 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33), 
food and tobacco (SIC 20, 21, 54), construction (SIC 15, 16, 17, 32), capital goods (SIC 34, 35, 38, 39), transportation (SIC 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47), textiles and trade 
(SIC 22, 23, 51, 53, 56, 59), services (SIC 7, 73, 75, 80, 82, 83, 87, 96), leisure (SIC 27, 58, 70, 79), unregulated utilities (SIC 48), regulated utilities (SIC 49), and 
financials (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67). Source: Worldscope and firms’ annual reports. 
Media Attention  TOTAL  Log of the total number of articles covering stories on a sample of firms. 
Country-level Variables     
Legal origin  ORIGIN  Legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country (English common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law). Source: 
La Porta et al. (1998a), Claessens, Djankov, and Nenova (1999), and the World Fact Book 2000 (the Central Intelligence Agency). The World Fact Book 2000 is 
available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 
Legal protection for investors  INVESTOR  Anti-director index. An index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to 
deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities mechanism is in place, (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is 
less than or equal to ten percent, or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. Range: 0-6. Source: La Porta et al. 
(1998a), Claessens, Djankov, and Nenova (1999), and Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000). 
Rule of law  ENFORCE  Assessment of the law and order tradition of the country. Monthly average between 1999 and 2000. Range: 0-10.  Source: International Country Risk Guide. Original 
data are transformed from 0-6 to 0-10 as in La Porta et al. (1998a). 
Quality of legal regime  LEGAL  INVESTOR × ENFORCE.  
Newspaper circulation  NEWS  The number of newspapers per capita. Source: Dyck and Zingales (2002). Original Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1996, as reported in the World 
Competitiveness Report. For Taiwan it is based on Editors and Publishers’ Association Year Book and AC Nielsen; for Hong Kong, as reported in “Asian Top Media –
Taiwan” at www.business.vu.edu. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table VI 
Correlation Coefficients between Main Variables 
 
This table reports correlation coefficients between main variables. All correlation coefficients, except for WEDGE, ADR, and CONSOL are simple correlation 
coefficients. Correlation coefficients for WEDGE, ADR, CONSOL are Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at 
which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in bold face. Firms that 
belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded from the sample. The sample size ranges from 127 to 456 firms depending on the pair of 
variables under consideration.  Panel B correlations are based on CLSA sample. Refer to Table V for definitions of variables. 
  
 
Panel A. Correlation Coefficients between CLSA Scores, S&P Ranking, Legal Regime, and Firm-level 
Variables  
 
COMP  PROTECT SOCIAL  TRAN  Firm-level variables 
0.18 0.18 0.24  0.08  Q 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.08)   
0.05  0.13  -0.06 0.07  EXT_FIN 
(0.35) (0.02) (0.30)  (0.16)   
0.08 0.05 -0.04  0.15  INV_OPP 
(0.13) (0.39) (0.43)  (0.00)   
-0.04  -0.19  0.01  0.25  SIZE 
(0.46) (0.00) (0.88)  (0.00)   
-0.19  -0.14 0.03  -0.02  OWN_CASH 
(0.00) (0.11) (0.76)  (0.79)   
0.04 -0.09 0.04  -0.06  WEDGE 
(0.69) (0.30) (0.70)  (0.46)   
0.04 0.01 0.13  0.07  R&D 
(0.40) (0.86) (0.02)  (0.16)   
-0.05 0.04 0.10 -0.18  EXPORT 
(0.37) (0.40) (0.07)  (0.00)   
0.16  -0.06 0.05 0.02  ADR 
(0.00) (0.21) (0.29)  (0.67)   
0.15  -0.004  -0.20 0.18  CONSOL 
(0.00) (0.99) (0.00)  (0.00)   
      Legal Regime Variables 
0.23 0.28 0.15  0.17  INVESTOR 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)   
0.14 0.23 -0.21  0.54  ENFORCE 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)   
0.27 0.34 -0.02  0.41  LEGAL 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.65)  (0.00)   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Panel B. Correlation Coefficients between Legal Regime Variables and Firm-level Variables (based on CLSA sample) 
Q EXT_FIN  INV_OPP  OWN_CASH  WEDGE  SIZE  R&D  EXPORT  ADR  CONSOL  Legal Regime variables 
0.24 0.16 -0.03  -0.32  0.13  -0.17  0.0002 0.02  -0.07  -0.35  INVESTOR 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.64)  (0.00) (0.14)  (0.00) (0.96) (0.64) (0.17) (0.00)   
0.07 0.02 -0.07  -0.21  -0.10  -0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.08 0.06  ENFORCE 
(0.18) (0.77) (0.20)  (0.02) (0.25)  (0.49) (0.18) (0.82) (0.14) (0.24)   
0.23 0.15 -0.09  -0.33  0.004  -0.13  0.04 0.02 -0.12 -0.21  LEGAL 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.08)  (0.00) (0.97)  (0.01) (0.42) (0.66) (0.02) (0.00)   
            Firm-level  variables 
  0.32 0.24  0.20 -0.09  -0.24 0.15 0.28 -0.01  -0.10  Q 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.34)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.82) (0.05)   
   -0.09 0.31  -0.06 -0.08  -0.02  0.13  -0.06  -0.16  EXT_FIN 
    (0.10)  (0.00) (0.53)  (0.16) (0.74) (0.02) (0.24) (0.00)   
    0.09  -0.19  -0.06  0.11  0.06  0.11  0.07  INV_OPP 
      (0.34) (0.04)  (0.30) (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) (0.23)   
      -0.25  -0.11 -0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.17  OWNER_CASH 
        (0.00)  (0.22) (0.54) (0.56) (0.77) (0.06)   
       -0.05  0.01  -0.09  0.15  0.02  WEDGE 
       (0.58)  (0.87)  (0.31)  (0.08)  (0.83)   
         - 0 . 0 2   -0.11 0.17 0.16  SIZE 
         (0.75)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
          0.17  0.04  -0.25  R&D 
          (0.00)  (0.47)  (0.00)   
           - 0 . 0 2   -0.32  EXPORT 
           (0.76)  (0.00)   
            0 . 0 4   ADR 
            ( 0 . 4 7 )    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table VII 
Country-Random Effects Regressions of CLSA Governance and S&P Transparency Scores on 
Investment Opportunities, External Financing Needs, Legal Regimes, and Control Variables 
 
This table reports the results of country-random effects regressions: 
CORP GOV INV OPP EXT FIN LEGAL INV OPP LEGAL EXT FIN LEGAL
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where c indexes country; i indexes industry; and j indexes firm. α is a constant, E[εj
c] = 0, E[εj
c εk
c] ≠ 0 ∀ j and k, and E is the expectation operator. 
CORP_GOV is one of CLSA corporate governance scores (COMP, PROTECT, or SOCIAL) or S&P transparency ranking (TRAN) in 2000; d are industry 
dummies (coefficients are not reported); INV_OPP (investment opportunities) is 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average of growth rate in net sales 
(winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); EXT_FIN (external financing needs) is the difference between 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average growth 
rate in total assets minus 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average maximum sustainable growth rate, where the latter is equal to ROE / (1 – ROE), and 
ROE (return on equity) is net income over book value of  equity (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where 
INVESTOR is the anti-director index, and ENFORCE is rule of law; INV_OPP *LEGAL and EXT_FIN *LEGAL are interaction terms for investment 
opportunities and external financing needs with the quality of legal environment, respectively. Z are control variables: SIZE is log of sales, 1999-to-2000 
two-year average; R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 average; EXPORT is export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 
two-year average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm’s shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in either 1999 or 2000, and zero, otherwise; 
and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm consolidates its financial statements, and zero, otherwise.  Numbers in parentheses are probability 
levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in 
boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded from the sample. We drop firms from the sample if they do not 
have one of the following items in a given year of interest: total assets, sales, book value of equity, or net income. If all items, except for R&D expenditures 
and export, are available, we set those two equal to zero. Refer to Table V for definitions of variables.  
 
Dependent  Variables: CLSA Governance and S&P 
Transparency Scores  COMP PROTECT  TRAN SOCIAL 
INV_OPP  14.089 21.270  35.737  6.421 
  (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.44) 
EXT_FIN  4.363 16.223  9.154  -9.900 
  (0.08) (0.01)  (0.14)  (0.09) 
LEGAL  0.490 1.013  0.352  -0.091 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.49) 
INV_OPP *LEGAL  -0.525 -0.579  -1.125  -0.466 
  (0.00) (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.16) 
EXT_FIN *LEGAL  -0.083  -0.443  -0.302 0.258 
  (0.24) (0.04)  (0.19)  (0.25) 
SIZE  0.879 -3.325  1.235  1.137 
  (0.08) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.24) 
R&D  19.874 -22.812  12.503  139.853 
  (0.59) (0.78)  (0.62)  (0.05) 
EXPORT  -6.240  0.943  -13.629  9.981 
  (0.09) (0.91)  (0.00)  (0.17) 
ADR  6.668  2.576 0.553  2.142 
  (0.00) (0.51)  (0.71)  (0.54) 
CONSOL  6.420  4.333  3.653 -12.992 
  (0.00) (0.24)  (0.05)  (0.00) 
Wald-test statistics of overall significance  101.10 92.570  124.92  50.82 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.240 0.224  0.231  0.137 
Number of Companies  344 344  439  344 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table VIII 
Country-Random Effects Regressions of CLSA Governance and S&P Transparency Scores on 
Ownership Concentration, Legal Regimes, and Control Variables 
      
This table reports the results of country-random effects regressions: 
CORP GOV OWN CASH OWN CASH WEDGE LEGAL
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where c indexes country; i indexes industry; and j indexes firm. α is a constant, E[εj
c] = 0, E[εj
c εk
c] ≠ 0 ∀ j and k, and E is the expectation operator. 
CORP_GOV is one of CLSA corporate governance scores (COMP, PROTECT, or SOCIAL) or S&P transparency ranking (TRAN) in 2000; d are 
industry dummies (coefficients are not reported); OWN_CASH is the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder, defined as in Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2002) in 1996; (OWNER_CASH)
2 is a squared term for cash flow ownership; WEDGE is a dummy variable, equal to one if 
CONTROL - OWN_CASH ≥ 10% and zero, otherwise, where CONTROL is the share of voting rights held by the largest shareholder defined as in 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2002) in 1996; LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where INVESTOR is the anti-director index, and ENFORCE is rule 
of law; OWN_CASH*LEGAL is the interaction term for the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder with the quality of legal 
environment. Z are control variables: SIZE is log of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by 
sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; EXPORT is export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal to one if a 
firm’s shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in either 1999 or 2000, and zero, otherwise; and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm 
consolidates its financial statements, and zero, otherwise.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero 
coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Panel B excludes firms 
that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67). We drop firms from the sample if they do not have sales or ownership information in a 
given year of interest. We also exclude firms with control rights less than five percent. If all items, except for R&D expenditures and export, are 
available, we set those two equal to zero. Refer to Table V for definitions of variables.   
 
 
  Panel A: Financial firms are included  Panel B: Financial firms are excluded 
Dependent Variable  COMP 
 
PROTECT  TRAN 
 
SOCIAL  COMP 
 
PROTECT 
 
TRAN  SOCIAL 
OWN_CASH  0.575 1.691  0.192 -0.595  0.481  1.477  0.190 -1.071 
  (0.04)  (0.01) (0.15)  (0.26) (0.11) (0.03) (0.21) (0.11) 
(OWN_CASH)
2  -0.005 -0.015  -0.001 0.005  -0.004  -0.014  -0.001  0.009 
  (0.05)  (0.01) (0.12)  (0.30) (0.13) (0.02) (0.17) (0.10) 
WEDGE  -0.829  -8.640  -0.803 1.371  0.141  -7.066  0.747  -0.871 
  (0.70)  (0.08) (0.69)  (0.74) (0.95) (0.21) (0.76) (0.87) 
LEGAL  0.864 1.447  0.599  -0.220  0.816 1.491 0.588 -0.350 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) 
OWN_CASH *LEGAL  -0.010  -0.030  -0.005 0.017  -0.006  -0.026  -0.004  0.022 
  (0.18)  (0.08) (0.25)  (0.24) (0.49) (0.17) (0.38) (0.23) 
SIZE  1.085 -1.973  0.411  1.804  -0.857  -6.847  0.261 0.585 
  (0.12)  (0.22) (0.42)  (0.18) (0.33) (0.00) (0.66) (0.77) 
R&D  -92.774  -546.453  22.817 -71.505 -120.102  -602.535  29.295 -63.469 
  (0.49)  (0.08) (0.52)  (0.78) (0.36) (0.04) (0.40) (0.83) 
EXPORT  -0.388 13.545  -24.857 6.594 0.734  17.700  -25.405  7.756 
  (0.95)  (0.38) (0.00)  (0.61) (0.91) (0.23) (0.00) (0.60) 
ADR  4.515 -8.561  -1.962  11.907  7.045  -6.147  -3.972  15.792 
  (0.28)  (0.38) (0.45)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.55) (0.18) (0.12) 
CONSOL  2.442 4.567  0.238  -8.333  -1.296  -4.429  3.112  -2.656 
  (0.54)  (0.62) (0.95)  (0.28) (0.77) (0.66) (0.49) (0.79) 
Wald-test statistics of joint significance  3307.560 1049.20  3670.91 1601.170  1001.140  860.380  1000.160  992.150 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.442  0.326  0.344  0.118 0.500 0.461 0.391 0.127 
Number of Companies   173  173 240  173 124  124 177 124 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
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Table IX 
Country-Random Effects Regressions of Firm Valuation on CLSA Governance and S&P 
Transparency Scores, Legal Regimes, and Control Variables 
 
This table reports the results of country-random effects regressions: 
Valuation CORP GOV LEGAL CORP GOV LEGAL Z d j
c
j
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where c indexes country; i indexes industry; and j indexes firm. α is a constant, E[εj
c] = 0, E[εj
c εk
c] ≠ 0 ∀ j and k, and E is the expectation operator.  
Valuation is 2000-to-2001 two-year average of Tobin’s Q defined as total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity over total assets, 
where the market value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding times year-end share price (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); 
CORP_GOV is one of CLSA corporate governance scores (COMP, PROTECT, or SOCIAL) or S&P transparency ranking (TRAN) in 2000; d are 
industry dummies (coefficients are not reported); LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where INVESTOR  is the anti-director index, and ENFORCE is 
rule of law; CORP_GOV * LEGAL is the interaction term for CORP_GOV with the quality of legal environment. Z are control variables: INV_OPP 
(investment opportunities) is 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average of growth rate in net sales (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); SIZE is log 
of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; EXPORT is 
export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm’s shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in 
either 1999 or 2000, and zero, otherwise; and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm consolidates its financial statements, and zero, 
otherwise.  Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients significant at 
least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded 
from the sample. In Panel B we exclude the governance and disclosure scores and the interaction terms for governance and disclosure scores with legal 
regime. We drop firms from the sample if they do not have one of the following items in a given year of interest: sales, total assets, book value of 
equity, number of common shares outstanding, or year-end share price. If all items, except for R&D expenditures and export are available, we set those 
two equal to zero. Refer to Table V for definitions of variables. Coefficients on CORP_GOV and CORP_GOV * LEGAL are multiplied by 100. 
 
  Panel A  Panel B 
Dependent variable  Tobin’s Q 
COMPOSITE  1.950  - -  - - 
  (0.06)       
PROTECT  -  1.711 -  -  - 
    (0.05)      
TRANS  -  -  0.905 -  - 
     (0.04)     
SOCIAL  -  - -  0.436  - 
       (0.44)   
LEGAL  0.010  0.005 0.016  0.001 0.017 
  (0.67)  (0.75) (0.20)  (0.99) (0.00) 
CORP_GOV *LEGAL  -0.026  -0.012  -0.006  0.030  - 
  (0.10)  (0.12) (0.00)  (0.19)   
INV_OPP  0.820  0.840 0.843  0.888 0.854 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE  -0.104  -0.074  -0.113 -0.098  -0.087 
  (0.02)  (0.11) (0.00)  (0.03) (0.06) 
R&D  5.711  6.371 5.075  4.292  6.147 
  (0.09)  (0.06) (0.01)  (0.20) (0.07) 
EXPORT  1.795  1.629 1.226  1.479 1.625 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ADR  -0.137  -0.081 -0.037  -0.044 -0.069 
  (0.41)  (0.62) (0.76)  (0.79) (0.67) 
CONSOL  -0.513  -0.422  0.104 -0.228 -0.404 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.47)  (0.15) (0.01) 
Wald-test statistics of joint significance 
 
1287.280 1248.080 1500.73  1330.270  1239.530 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression R
2  0.344  0.328 0.282  0.361 0.321 
Number of Companies  344  344 438  344 344 
  
 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 554 
  58
 
 
 
Table X 
Three-stage Least Squares Regression Estimation of the Relation between Valuation and CLSA Governance and S&P 
Transparency Scores 
 
This table reports the results of three-stage least squares estimation of the following system of equations: 
CORP GOV Valuation INV OPP EXT FIN LEGAL SIZE R D EXPORT ADR CONSOL ALPHA BETA
Valuation CORP GOV INV OPP LEGAL
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where c indexes country; i indexes industry;  and j indexes firm. Valuation is 2000-to-2001 two-year average of Tobin’s Q defined as total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity 
over total assets, where the market value of equity is the number of common shares outstanding times year-end share price (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); CORP_GOV is one of CLSA 
corporate governance scores (COMP or PROTECT), or S&P transparency ranking (TRAN) in 2000; d are industry dummies (coefficients are not reported); LEGAL is INVESTOR × ENFORCE, where 
INVESTOR is the anti-director index, and ENFORCE is rule of law; INV_OPP (investment opportunities) is 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average of growth rate in net sales (winsorized at the 1
st 
and 99
th percentile); EXT_FIN (external financing needs) is the difference between 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average growth rate in total assets minus 1998-to-2000 two-year geometric average 
maximum sustainable growth rate, where the latter is equal to ROE / (1 – ROE), and ROE (return on equity) is net income over book value of  equity (winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile); SIZE is 
log of sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; R&D is research and development expenditures scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year average; EXPORT is export scaled by sales, 1999-to-2000 two-year 
average; ADR is a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm’s shares are listed on U.S. stock exchanges in either 1999 or 2000, and zero, otherwise; and CONSOL is a dummy variable, equal to one if a 
firm consolidates its financial statements, and zero, otherwise. ALPHA and BETA values are obtained from Worldscope, which are computed using between 23 and 35 consecutive month end percentage 
price changes relative to a local market index during years from 1999 to 2001. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero coefficient can be rejected. Coefficients 
significant at least at the ten percent level (based on two-tailed test) are in boldface. Firms that belong to financial industries (SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67) are excluded from the sample. We drop firms 
from the sample if they do not have one of the following items in a given year of interest: sales, total assets, book value of equity, net income, number of common shares outstanding, or year-end share 
price. If all items, except for R&D expenditures and export, are available, we set those two equal to zero. Regression R
2 is not reported because it has no statistical meaning in case of three-stage least 
squares estimation. Refer to Table V for definitions of variables. The Coefficient on CORP_GOV is multiplied with 100 
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Panel A 
CLSA Sample, COMP 
Panel B 
CLSA Sample, PROTECT 
Panel C 
S&P Sample, TRAN 
 
Governance Equation: 
Dep. Variable, 
COMP 
Valuation Equation: 
Dep. Variable, 
Q 
Governance Equation:
Dep. Variable, 
PROTECT 
Valuation Equation: 
Dep. Variable, 
Q 
Governance Equation:
Dep. Variable, 
TRAN 
Valuation Equation: 
Dep. Variable, 
Q 
Q  0.878 -  2.932  -  -4.662  - 
  (0.59)   (0.42)    (0.03)  
CORP_GOV  -  4.680  -  3.198  -  0.566 
   (0.00)    (0.00)   (0.04) 
INV_OPP  6.323 1.030  1.859  0.982  12.719  0.105 
  (0.05) (0.00)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.27)   
EXT_FIN  2.098  -  9.208  -  11.272  - 
  (0.05)   (0.01)    (0.00)  
LEGAL  0.339  -0.002  0.806  -0.134  0.307  0.072 
  (0.00) (0.85)  (0.00)  (0.20)  (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE  -0.815  -  -2.475  -  1.010  - 
  (0.06)   (0.01)    (0.01)  
R&D  -8.045 4.273  -31.268  4.797  -26.396 4.051 
  (0.81) (0.21)   (0.68)  (0.23)  (0.31) (0.20) 
EXPORT  -4.356  1.753  -1.449  1.186  -18.898  -0.345 
  (0.29) (0.00)  (0.88)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.68) 
ADR  6.519 -0.318  -3.252  0.099  -1.052 -0.240 
  (0.00) (0.09)  (0.38)  (0.64)  (0.49) (0.24) 
CONSOL  6.511 -0.883  2.164  -0.580  1.655 0.279 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.00)  (0.42) (0.39) 
ALPHA  0.251 -  0.442  -  0.480 - 
  (0.38)   (0.40)    (0.18)  
BETA  -5.450  -  -8.508  -  -1.186 - 
  (0.00)   (0.00)    (0.26)     
Industry dummies  no yes  no  yes  no yes 
χ
2 statistics  103.230 173.904  885.140  112.046  138.454 59.746 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of firms  302  302  396  
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